Patent Office Cohorts by Frakes, Michael D. & Wasserman, Melissa F.
FRAKES AND WASSERMAN IN PRINTER FINAL (UPDATED PAGE NUMBERS) (DO NOT DELETE) 4/21/2016 3:36 PM 
 
PATENT OFFICE COHORTS 
MICHAEL D. FRAKES† & MELISSA F. WASSERMAN†† 
ABSTRACT 
  Concerns regarding low-quality patents and inconsistent decisions 
prompted Congress to enact the first major patent reform act in over 
sixty years and likewise spurred the Supreme Court to take a renewed 
interest in substantive patent law. Because little compelling empirical 
evidence exists as to what features affect the patent office’s granting 
behavior, policymakers have been trying to fix the patent system 
without understanding the root causes of its dysfunction. 
  This Article aims to fill at least part of this gap by examining one 
factor that may affect patent examiners’ grant rates throughout their 
tenures: the year in which they were hired by the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office (PTO). An examiner may develop a general 
examination “style” in the critical early stages of her career that 
persists even in the face of changes in application quality or patent 
allowance culture at the agency. To the extent initial hiring 
environments influence a newly hired examiner’s practice style, 
variations in such initial conditions suggest examiners of different 
hiring cohorts may follow distinct, enduring pathways with their 
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examination practices. Consistent with this prediction, we find strong 
evidence that the year an examiner was hired has a lasting effect on 
her granting patterns over the course of her career. Moreover, we find 
that the variation in the granting patterns of different PTO cohorts 
aligns with observed fluctuations in the initial conditions faced by 
such cohorts. By documenting the existence of cohort effects and by 
demonstrating the importance of initial environments in explaining 
certain long-term outcomes, this analysis holds various implications 
for patent policy and the administrative state more generally. 
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INTRODUCTION 
There is widespread belief that the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office (PTO) issues too many low-quality patents that unnecessarily 
drain consumer welfare and stunt productive research.1 There is also a 
general consensus that the Agency’s patentability determinations are 
inconsistent across individual examiners—that is, the PTO’s decision 
to grant a patent application is driven not only by the merits of the 
invention but also by the proclivities of the examiner to whom the 
application is randomly assigned.2 Concerns regarding patent quality 
and inconsistent patentability decisions prompted Congress to enact 
the first major patent reform act in over sixty years,3 spurred the 
Supreme Court to take a renewed interest in substantive patent law,4 
and drove the PTO to hold its first Patent Quality Summit.5 Yet 
because limited compelling empirical evidence exists as to what 
features of the Agency affect its granting behavior, policymakers have 
largely been trying to fix the patent system without understanding the 
root causes of its pathology. 
Building upon recent efforts by the Authors to fill these gaps and 
to identify certain determinants of the Agency’s granting practices, 
this Article investigates an additional, unexplored factor that may 
substantially affect a patent examiner’s grant rate throughout her 
tenure: the year the examiner was hired by the Agency.6 Management 
 
 1. See infra Part I.  
 2. See infra Part I. 
 3. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).  
 4. Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Is the Patent Office a Rubber Stamp?, 58 EMORY 
L.J. 181, 185 (2009). 
 5. U.S PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, Patent Quality Summit, http://www.uspto.gov/
patent/ initiatives/patent-quality-summit [http://perma.cc/RZ2J-SQLZ] (last updated June 2, 
2015). 
 6. Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Does Agency Funding Affect 
Decisionmaking?: An Empirical Assessment of the PTO’s Granting Patterns, 66 VAND. L. REV. 
67, 96 (2013) [hereinafter Frakes & Wasserman, Agency Funding] (finding evidence that the 
PTO’s fee structure biases a resource-constrained agency toward allowing patents); Michael D. 
Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Does the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Grant Too Many 
Bad Patents?: Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment, 67 STAN. L. REV. 613, 617 (2015) [hereinafter 
Frakes & Wasserman, Bad Patents] (finding evidence that the PTO’s inability to finally reject a 
patent application biases a resource-constrained agency toward allowing patents); Michael D. 
Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Is the Time Allocated to Review Patent Applications Inducing 
Examiners to Grant Invalid Patents?: Evidence from Micro-Level Application Data, REV. ECON. 
& STAT. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 3–4) [hereinafter Frakes & Wasserman, Time 
Allocated], http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2467262 [https://perma.cc/
D6G N-RML5] (finding evidence that patent examiners are facing binding time constraints that 
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and labor scholars have long surmised that new hires are particularly 
impressionable during the beginning of their employment. During 
this initial period of training—be it formal or informal—new hires 
may begin to develop distinct “styles” of practice that become 
entrenched over time.7 This is especially true among workers like 
patent examiners that operate within a reasonably wide range of 
discretion. With this manner of learning in mind, the initial conditions 
to which an examiner is exposed at the PTO are of potentially critical 
importance. If a particular cohort of examiners is trained in a culture 
characterized by a very permissive granting philosophy, it is possible 
that this cohort will remain generally permissive throughout their 
careers, even if future Agency heads aspire to instill a restrictive 
attitude among the examiners corps. Accordingly, examiners may 
exhibit “stickiness” in practices. Given that initial hiring 
environments will likely vary over time, one might predict that 
examiners of different hiring cohorts develop along diverging 
pathways. In order to understand what drives both the levels of 
observed grant rates themselves and the variability in such grant rates 
across examiners, it is important to appreciate the existence and the 
nature of such diverging cohort effects.  
To empirically test whether the year an examiner is hired by the 
PTO has a lasting effect on an examiner’s grant rate, we amassed a 
rich database of previously unavailable data on individual patent 
applications with the help of the National Center for Supercomputing 
Applications at the University of Illinois. We also supplemented it 
with information on examiners’ personnel histories (dating back to at 
least 1992) that we received by filing various Freedom of Information 
Act (FOIA) requests with the PTO. This novel patent application 
database comprises all 1,956,493 utility patent applications filed on or 
after March 2001 that were published by the Agency prior to July 
2012. With rich historical information on the examinations performed 
by a number of overlapping cohorts of examiners, we then estimated 
empirical specifications which allowed us to determine the 
relationship between examiners’ grant rates and the hiring cohorts to 
which they belonged. Notably, when estimating these specifications 
we simultaneously controlled for a range of related factors that may 
have also shaped grant rates through other mechanisms including, 
 
biases them toward allowing patents and that an examiner’s grade level has explanatory power 
as to her grant rate). 
 7. See infra Part I.  
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importantly, the year in which the application itself was processed 
and the experience level (in years) of the examiners at such times. 
Ultimately, we find strong evidence of the existence of cohort 
effects—that is, evidence that the year an examiner was hired has an 
enduring effect on her granting patterns over the tenure of her career. 
In addition, we find these effects to be large in magnitude—that is, we 
estimate substantial differences in granting tendencies across the 
various hiring cohorts. For example, after controlling for examiner 
experience, general time trends, and other characteristics of the 
applications in our sample, we find that examiners in the 1993 hiring 
cohort have a mean grant rate roughly 11 percentage points (or 16 
percent) higher than those examiners starting in the late 2000s. 
In addition, we find that the observed differences in the mean 
grant rates of the various examiner cohorts align with changes in both 
the Agency’s culture regarding the allowance of patents as well as 
new-hire training programs at the PTO. For instance, the decline in 
the mean grant rate for those new cohorts starting in the mid-2000s 
relative to the older cohorts within the Agency matches up with a 
shift toward a more restrictive approach in the allowance of patents, a 
cultural shift evidenced in part by the initiation of a new and 
significant patent-quality initiative implemented in 2003/2004.8 To be 
sure, the grant rate does fall somewhat among all examiners at this 
time, including among the older cohorts. The new examiners hired by 
the Agency after the implementation of the new quality programs, 
however, set out on a granting trajectory that was systematically 
lower than that of the older cohorts (again, even when accounting for 
general annual trends and for differences in experience levels across 
examiners). 
Our results have a number of implications for both patent policy 
and the administrative state. To begin, our results suggest that culture 
promulgated from high-ranking officials during the beginning of an 
examiner’s employment plays an important role in shaping her 
behavior throughout her career. Thus, our analysis highlights the 
import that agency-level preferences play in patent office outcomes. 
Although the existing literature has recognized that patent examiners 
operate with substantial discretion when applying the patentability 
standards, it has failed to fully appreciate the role that Agency heads 
 
 8. See infra Part II.B. 
FRAKES AND WASSERMAN IN PRINTER FINAL (UPDATED PAGE NUMBERS) (DO NOT DELETE) 4/21/2016  3:36 PM 
1606 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:1601 
play in shaping and limiting this discretion.9 Our results also suggest 
that, to the extent Agency leaders want to diminish the degree of 
heterogeneity in patent office outcomes across examiners or reduce 
the extent to which patent examiners allow non-meritorious 
applications, they might face at least some degree of friction in light 
of the stickiness of examiner behavior. That is, because what patent 
examiners learn during the beginning of their employment can have 
an enduring effect on their granting styles, a PTO that seeks to 
achieve certain objectives may need to tailor its policies to address 
differences in examiner cohorts. Finally, our results also provide 
insight into topics that have long been of interest to scholars of the 
administrative state. Cohort effects raise the costs of changing agency 
policy today and in the future. Understanding how cohort dynamics 
work to entrench agency policy over time also provides insight into 
the effectiveness of agency monitors and the strategies available for 
an agency to achieve its interests over a long-term horizon. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Part I briefly 
describes the primary complaints that scholars and stakeholders have 
registered against the patent system: the PTO issues too many low-
quality patents, while also inconsistently applying the patentability 
standards across examiners. Part II theorizes why the year an 
examiner was hired may have a lasting influence on the examiner’s 
granting proclivities. This Part also describes how the granting culture 
of the Agency, as evidenced by the quality-assurance program of the 
PTO and new-hire training, has varied over time. Part II also 
delineates several testable hypotheses that will guide our empirical 
analysis. Part III describes the dataset and the methodology 
employed to test our hypotheses. The results of our empirical analysis 
are presented in Part IV. In Part V, we explore some of the 
implications of our findings for both the patent-quality debate and 
administrative law more generally. 
 
 9. See Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, Ending the Patenting Monopoly, 157 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1541, 1559–60, 1563–64 (2009) (discussing the difficulty the PTO has controlling 
examiner conduct despite strict rules and oversight); Iain M. Cockburn, Samuel Kortum & Scott 
Stern, Are All Patent Examiners Equal? Examiners, Patent Characteristics, and Litigation 
Outcomes, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 28 (Wesley M. Cohen & 
Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003) (noting that “substantial discretion is provided to examiners in 
how they deal with applications”); Frakes & Wasserman, Agency Funding, supra note 6, at 74–
75. 
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I.  HARMS ASSOCIATED WITH INVALID PATENTS  
AND INCONSISTENT PATENTABILITY DECISIONS 
There is widespread agreement that the U.S. PTO grants too 
many invalid patents—that is, the Agency grants patents to inventions 
even though they fail to meet the patentability requirements.10 It is 
undeniable that invalid patents impose a multitude of costs on 
society. Erroneously issued patents can unnecessarily limit 
competition by impeding new market entrants11 and by compromising 
the business relations of those already in the market.12 Nonpracticing 
entities or patent trolls can utilize invalid patents to opportunistically 
extract licensing revenue from innovators.13 Erroneously issued 
patents can also stunt follow-on innovation.14 More fundamentally, 
invalid patents can result in supracompetitive pricing and diminished 
quantity without providing society with any innovative benefit.15 
Observers have also criticized the PTO on the grounds that its 
patentability decisions are inconsistent across examiners. That is, 
 
 10. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF 
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 5–7 (2003), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/
 innovationrpt.pdf [http://perma.cc/A5UB-8F6Q]; JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, 
PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 3 
(2008); ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR 
PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT 
IT 11–13 (2004).  
 11. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 10, at 3 (noting that allowing patents on obvious 
inventions can thwart competition); Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effects of 
Unenforced Invalid Patents, 91 MINN. L. REV. 101, 119–25 (2006). 
 12. Customers may be deterred from transacting with a company out of fear of a 
contributory patent-infringement suit. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. 
Supp. 2d 514, 544 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (“Dow alleged that Exxon had threatened to sue actual and 
prospective Dow customers for patent infringement, even though Exxon allegedly had no good-
faith belief that Dow infringed the patent when Exxon made the threats and had allegedly 
obtained the patent by inequitable conduct.” (citing Dow Chem. Co. v. Exxon Corp., 139 F.3d 
1470, 1472, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1998))); Leslie, supra note 11, at 125–27. 
 13. James Bessen, The Patent Troll Crisis is Really a Software Patent Crisis, WASH. POST 
(Sept. 3, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/09/03/the-patent-troll-
crisis-is-really-a-software-patent-crisis [http://perma.cc/A5TQ-AZMP]. 
 14. Alberto Galasso & Mark Schankerman, Patents and Cumulative Innovation: Causal 
Evidence from the Courts, 130 Q.J. ECON. 317, 318 (2015); Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the 
Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 32 (1991) 
(noting that overly broad patent protection “can lead to deficient incentives to develop second 
generation products”); Bhaven Sampat & Heidi L. Williams, How Do Patents Affect Follow-on 
Innovation? Evidence from the Human Genome (Feb. 12, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), 
http:// economics.mit.edu/files/9778 [http://perma.cc/2H9B-GZ3A]. 
 15. Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Examiner Characteristics and Patent Office 
Outcomes, 94 REV. ECON. & STAT. 817, 817 (2012).  
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there is a growing concern that the decision to grant a patent 
application is driven not only by the merits of the invention but also 
by happenstance as to which examiner the application is randomly 
assigned.16 A PTO that treats similar applications in dissimilar ways is 
problematic for several reasons. To begin, the existence of inter-
examiner disparity itself demonstrates how much discretionary 
authority PTO examiners wield and instills little confidence that they 
are exercising this discretion to apply patentability standards in a 
guided and regimented manner. In other words, inconsistent behavior 
across examiners leaves observers wondering whether examiners are 
systematically “missing the mark” in making validity determinations. 
The patentability standards are set to generally parallel the economic 
justifications for patents—that is, a patent should not be granted to an 
invention that is not novel because such non-novel patents have the 
potential to impose the costs of the patent system on society without 
producing the commensurate innovative benefits. As a result, the 
consequences of examiners routinely reaching erroneous patentability 
determinations can be substantial. 
Aside from the concerns that inconsistent examinations invoke 
regarding the quality of the review process itself, inter-examiner 
disparity may also erode confidence in the PTO by creating the 
appearance of unfairness and arbitrariness.17 Such an appearance 
could diminish the incentives for innovation, as would-be applicants 
decide instead to pursue other endeavors. Of course, inconsistent 
patentability decisions are also worrisome solely from an equity 
standpoint. 
Finally, it should be noted that, although concerns over inter-
examiner disparity and over the issuance of invalid patents are very 
much related, they can also be analyzed as separate and distinct 
concepts. After all, it is possible that the PTO could have highly 
inconsistent decisions that generally converge around the proper 
application of the patentability standards. It is also possible that the 
Agency could have highly consistent decisions that reflect examiners’ 
 
 16. See Cockburn et al., supra note 9, at 19 (finding that differences in examiners explain a 
significant percentage of the variation in the characteristics of issued patents, and that some 
examiners are more likely than others to have their patents upheld in court); Douglas Lichtman, 
Rethinking Prosecution History Estoppel, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 151, 155 (2004) (finding that 
certain examiners more systematically required applicants to narrow the scope of their patents).  
 17. See JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE 73 (1983); Abramowicz & Duffy, 
supra note 9, at 1558 (noting that the PTO’s “challenge is to ensure that the judgments of [its 
patent examiners] are relatively high quality and highly consistent”).  
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biases toward granting or rejecting patents. As such, in our analysis 
below, we attempt to address the implications of cohort dynamics 
within the PTO with each of these distinct social concerns in mind. 
The quality and consistency of the PTO’s judgments have 
become such important and visible issues that Congress, the judiciary, 
and the Agency itself have taken steps to diminish the issuance of 
low-quality patents and bring uniformity to the Agency’s 
decisionmaking. The Supreme Court has recently taken a renewed 
interest in substantive patent law, wherein, among other things, it has 
strengthened the doctrine of nonobviousness in an effort to make it 
easier for the Agency to reject invalid patents.18 In 2011, Congress 
enacted the first major patent-reform bill in over six decades. This 
reform bill granted the agency new adjudicatory authorities and the 
ability to set its own fees, changes that were meant to increase both 
patent quality and consistency.19 Just last year, the PTO held the first 
Patent Quality Summit, where it sought input on a set of proposals 
for enhancing patent quality and consistency across examiner 
determinations.20 
Of course, finding a solution to the problems of low-quality 
issuances and inconsistent patentability determinations necessarily 
requires correctly identifying the features of the patent system that 
shape an examiner’s granting proclivities. Although commentators 
have suggested many reasons that the Agency may be inclined to 
grant invalid patents,21 there exists little compelling empirical 
evidence showing what features of the system drive an examiner’s 
decision to allow a patent (outside of the merits of the invention).22 
As a result, policymakers have been making changes to the patent 
 
 18. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 420 (2007). 
 19. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 6, 125 Stat. 284, 299–313 
(2011) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–19, 321–29) (providing for post-grant review 
proceedings); id. § 10, 125 Stat. at 316–20 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 41) (providing for 
fee-setting authority); id. § 12, 125 Stat. at 325–27 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 257) 
(providing for supplemental examination); id. § 18, 125 Stat. at 329–31 (codified as amended at 
35 U.S.C. § 321) (providing for a transitional program for covered business-method patents); 
H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 39–40 (noting that the primary purpose of the America Invents 
Act is to “improve patent quality”). 
 20. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 5. 
 21. See Frakes & Wasserman, Bad Patents, supra note 6, at 619 (summarizing the various 
reasons why the PTO may allow too many low-quality patents). 
 22. Id. at 621–25. But see Lemley & Sampat, supra note 15, at 817 (finding that experienced 
examiners cite less prior art and are more likely to grant patents); sources cited supra note 6 
(same).  
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system absent empirical evidence to help illuminate the actual 
problems at hand. This paper builds upon the prior efforts of the 
Authors to rectify this deficiency by examining how one factor likely 
influences a patent examiner’s decision to grant a patent: the year the 
patent examiner was hired by the PTO, together with the culture of 
the Agency and the nature of the training in place at such time.23 
II.  THEORY OF COHORT EFFECTS 
This Part provides the theory behind cohort effects and 
delineates several testable hypotheses that will guide our empirical 
analysis. Before doing so, however, it is helpful to provide a brief 
exposition of the patent-examination process. In order to obtain a 
patent, an individual must file an application with the PTO, an agency 
within the Department of Commerce. Before the application enters 
examination, it is routed to an art unit, a group of eight to fifteen 
patent examiners who review applications in the same technological 
field.24 Upon the patent application’s arrival, the Supervisory Patent 
Examiner of that art unit randomly assigns the application to a 
specific examiner.25 The assigned examiner then assesses the 
patentability of the invention based on the criteria outlined in the 
Patent Act. This process typically begins with the examiner 
performing a prior-art search to determine whether the invention is 
novel26 and represents more than a trivial advancement over the 
existing knowledge within the field.27 The examiner must also 
determine whether the invention comprises patentable subject 
matter28 and is useful,29 as well as whether the patent application meets 
the disclosure requirements.30 If the invention fails one of the specific 
patentability requirements, the examiner must reject the application.31 
If the application meets the patentability requirements, the examiner 
must issue the patent.32 Although the stages associated with the patent 
examination procedure are relatively structured, it is well-recognized 
 
 23. See sources cited supra note 6. 
 24. See Frakes & Wasserman, Time Allocated, supra note 6 (manuscript at 6). 
 25. Id.  
 26. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
 27. Id. § 103. 
 28. Id.  
 29. Id. § 101. 
 30. Id. § 112.  
 31. See Frakes & Wasserman, Time Allocated, supra note 6 (manuscript at 7–8).  
 32. Id. 
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that patent examiners are afforded substantial discretion on how they 
approach and execute the process.33 
With this brief exposition on the review of patent applications, 
this Part now turns to examining why the year in which an examiner is 
hired by the PTO may have a lasting effect on an examiner’s granting 
patterns. Section A provides support for the proposition that, because 
new hires are rather susceptible to influence, what they learn during 
this initial period has an enduring effect well beyond the employee’s 
period of acclimation to the organization. Sections B and C turn to 
exploring which formal and informal aspects of the PTO can help 
shape how newly hired patent examiners review patent applications. 
A. New-Hire Impressibility, External Stimuli, and Learning Stickiness 
Workers in many professions exercise some degree of discretion 
in executing the tasks required by their positions. Over time, they 
develop certain skills and methods that determine how they operate 
within the bounds of their discretion. The management literature has 
long recognized that early moments of employment are especially 
important in understanding how new hires are shaped.34 In general, 
this literature delineates three features that are essential for the 
cohort-effects phenomenon—that is, for the early-career period to 
have a persistent influence on how work duties are executed.35 The 
first unique feature of the cohort-effects argument is that new hires 
are significantly more malleable than individuals who have worked in 
an organization for a substantial duration of time.36 Newly hired 
 
 33. Cockburn et al., supra note 9, at 28 (noting that “substantial discretion is provided to 
examiners in how they deal with applications”). 
 34. See, e.g., Natalie J. Allen & John P. Meyer, Organizational Socialization Tactics: A 
Longitudinal Analysis of Links to Newcomers’ Commitment and Role Orientation, 33 ACAD. 
MGMT. J. 847 (1990); Bruce Buchanan II, Building Organizational Commitment: The 
Socialization of Managers in Work Organizations, 19 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 533 (1974).  
 35. Cohort effects can encompass more than the learning effect described in this Section. 
Management scientists often utilize cohort effects to refer to a high degree of similarity in 
outcomes within cohorts. See, e.g., Aparna Joshi, John C. Dencker, Gentz Franz & Joseph J. 
Martocchio, Unpacking Generational Identities in Organizations, 35 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 392, 
392–94 (2010). This intra-cohort homogeneity in outcomes could result from an imprinting 
effect—the initial conditions of an organization imprint a new employee—as we describe in this 
Section or because the organization hired individuals of similar traits in a given year (that is, 
individuals with similar education, ideological backgrounds, etc.). In Part IV.D, we argue that 
our results are more consistent with the former than the latter.  
 36. Gordon J. DiRenzo, Socialization, Personality, and Social Systems, 3 ANN. REV. SOC. 
261 (1977); Herminia Ibarra, Provisional Selves: Experimenting with Image and Identity in 
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employees are assumed to constitute more of a blank slate, in part, 
because of uncertainty regarding the new role requirements.37 During 
the initial period of employment, it is believed that “cognitive models 
that . . . [individuals] hold can be challenged and replaced with scripts 
and schema that are more congruent with the new environment.”38 
The second element of cohort effects is that external-
environmental features exert a substantial influence on individuals 
during their transition period with an organization.39 Given the 
enhanced impressionability of employees during the early stage of 
their careers, new employees are especially open to an organization’s 
environmental stimuli.40 As a result, the conditions of an organization 
during a new hire’s acclimation period are likely to have a strong 
influence on how the new hire approaches and executes her job 
functions.41  
The final element of the cohort-effects hypothesis is that this 
molding of behavior which occurs during an individual’s transition 
period with an organization persists long after she ceases to be a new 
hire and even if significant changes take place in the environment of 
an organization. Individuals tend to be less receptive to learning and 
environmental influences outside of role transitions, such as joining a 
new organization.42 Although individuals can still learn new skills 
outside of role transitions, the rate at which they learn is lower than 
when they are in a formative period. Thus, after the transitional 
period ends, individuals “freeze” their behavior and patterns: they 
stick with the skills and habits they have learned.43 As a result, an 
 
Professional Adaptation, 44 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 764 (1999); John Van Maanen & Edgar H. Schein, 
Toward a Theory of Organizational Socialization, 1 RES. ORG. BEHAV. 209 (1979).  
 37. Blake E. Ashforth & Alan M. Saks, Socialization Tactics: Longitudinal Effects on 
Newcomer Adjustment, 39 ACAD. MGMT. J. 149, 149 (1996). 
 38. Gina Dokko, Steffanie L. Wilk & Nancy P. Rothbard, Unpacking Prior Experience: 
How Career History Affects Job Performance, 20 ORG. SCI. 51, 55 (2009).  
 39. Edgar H. Schein, The Individual, the Organization, and the Career: A Conceptual 
Scheme, 7 J. APPLIED BEHAV. SCI. 401, 422–23 (1971).  
 40. Id. 
 41. See Pierre Azoulay, Christopher C. Liu & Toby E. Stuart, Social Influence Given 
(Partially) Deliberate Matching: Career Imprints in the Creation of Academic Entrepreneurs 4 
(Harvard Bus. Sch. Working Paper 09-136, 2009); Aleksandra J. Kacperczyk, Inside or Outside: 
The Social Mechanisms of Entrepreneurship Choices. Evidence from the Mutual Fund Industry 
33–35 (2009) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan). 
 42. See DiRenzo, supra note 36, at 268; Ibarra, supra note 36, at 767; Van Maanen & 
Schein, supra note 36, at 213.  
 43. Ashforth & Saks, supra note 37, at 171–72. 
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individual’s approach to her job will tend to bear the stamp of the 
environment she experienced during the early stage of her career. 
There are a growing number of studies in a variety of 
populations that have found empirical support for this cohorts 
phenomenon. For instance, an analysis of managers, lawyers, and 
scientists suggest that even when individuals move past the early 
apprenticeship stage of their careers, they continue to carry with them 
behaviors and beliefs adopted during the acclimation period.44 This 
evidence has led scholars to conclude that employees from a variety 
of disciplines such as academic advisors, accountants, coordinators, 
research specialists, and technicians are highly impressionable during 
these early stages. It has also led commentators to deduce that what 
employees learn during this period of acclimation to the organization 
can have a long-lasting effect on how they continue to operate within 
the range of their discretion down the road.45 
 
 44. MONICA C. HIGGINS, CAREER IMPRINTS: CREATING LEADERS ACROSS AN INDUSTRY 
12–14 (1st ed. 2005); Bill McEvily, Jonathan Jaffee & Marco Tortoriello, Not All Bridging Ties 
Are Equal: Network Imprinting and Firm Growth in the Nashville Legal Industry, 1933-1978, 23 
ORG. SCI. 547, 559–60 (2012); Damon J. Phillips, Organizational Genealogies and the Persistence 
of Gender Inequality: The Case of Silicon Valley Law Firms, 50 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 440, 467–68 
(2005); Azoulay et al., supra note 41. 
 45. Michael F. Gast & Paul J. Patinka, Imprinting the Young Employee, BUS. HORIZONS 11 
(July–Aug. 1983); John Kammeyer-Mueller, Connie Wanberg, Alex Rubenstein & Zhaoli Song, 
Support, Undermining and Newcomer Socialization: Fitting in During the First 90 Days, 56 
ACAD. MGMT. J. 1104, 1111 (2013). The idea that employees are most impressionable during 
the early stage of employment has been recognized in the workers-union context, see PAUL F. 
CLARK, BUILDING MORE EFFECTIVE UNIONS 57 (2009) (“It is extremely important for the 
union to make its case in these early stages of employment when the new employee is the most 
impressionable.”), the financial-advisors context, see LAUREN FARASATI, STAFF TO LAST!: FOR 
FINANCIAL ADVISORS ONLY: HOW TO BUILD A STAFF THAT MAKES YOUR CLIENTS HAPPY, 
YOUR PEERS JEALOUS, AND YOUR WALLET FAT 88 (2009) (“And the bulk of training occurs 
during the window in which new employees are both most impressionable and most vulnerable. 
Having a training structure will produce confident employees who learned the important stuff 
and the right skills from day one.”), as well as the medical-business context, see BOB PHIBBS, 
THE RETAIL DOCTOR’S GUIDE TO GROWING YOUR BUSINESS 140 (2010) (“Employees are 
most impressionable when they are first hired.”); see also ANDERS ORTENBLAD, HANDBOOK 
OF RESEARCH ON THE LEARNING ORGANIZATION: ADAPTATION AND CONTEXT 122 (2013) 
(noting that “[h]aving been deeply immersed in the protected business environment of SOEs in 
China over a protected period of time, many employees, especially old timers, had developed 
entrenched ‘social defenses’ against the learning and change . . . and were skeptical about the 
benefits promised by the reforms”); PETER B. GRAZIER, TEAM BUILDERS PLUS, OVERCOMING 
RESISTANCE TO EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT, http://teambuildersplus.com/articles/overcoming-
resistance-to-employee-involvement [http://perma.cc/UUW7-XZ9E] (“Because our prior 
training and condition is such a significant barrier to our ability to change, we need to take some 
very proactive steps.”).  
A related literature examines how employees have difficulty adjusting to new contexts 
and unlearning deeply embedded beliefs, practices, and knowledge. For instance, physicians 
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As a result, we begin by hypothesizing that patent examiners are 
particularly suggestible during their first year at the PTO and that the 
initial conditions faced by examiners at that time—that is, the 
allowance culture or the training practices—can have a persistent 
effect on how the examiner approaches the review of patent 
applications, including her general granting proclivities. In light of 
such persistence in behaviors and possible variations that likely exist 
in initial hiring conditions over time, we thus predict that examiners 
of different hiring cohorts will adopt and then largely maintain certain 
granting practices. 
Hypothesis 1: All else being equal, the year a patent examiner is 
hired by the Agency will impact the grant rate that she follows 
throughout the course of her tenure. 
B. The PTO’s Allowance Culture 
To the extent that new hires are particularly impressionable, 
initial hiring conditions may help explain an examiner’s granting 
proclivities over the course of her career. Certain conditions present 
at the PTO may be of paramount significance in this regard. Perhaps 
most saliently, the Agency’s allowance culture—or the emphasis that 
the PTO places on allowing versus rejecting patents—at the time an 
examiner was hired could have a long-lasting effect on her granting 
behavior. Such an effect may even persist in the face of shifts in the 
Agency’s allowance culture over the course of an examiner’s career.46 
Quantifying the PTO’s allowance disposition at any moment in 
time is inherently difficult. To help determine this feature of the 
Agency, we rely primarily upon qualitative assessments of the 
stringency of the Agency’s quality-assurance program. Although we 
recognize that other directives could serve as proxies for the Agency’s 
allowance culture, we nevertheless focus on the variation in the 
severity of the PTO’s quality-assurance mechanisms given that they 
 
have been accused of being slow to embrace a new model of healthcare that considers costs in 
their diagnostic and treatment recommendations or adjust their prescribing behavior of 
prescription drugs in light of new evidence. See, e.g., Eve Glicksman, Teaching Doctors How to 
Improve Care and Lower Costs . . . at the Same Time, AM. ASS’N MED. COLLEGES (June 2015), 
https://www.aamc.org/newsroom/reporter/june2015/434756/lower-costs.html [http://perma. cc/ 
7A C5- YEKC] (“Instilling cost awareness in physicians and asking them to consider costs in 
their diagnostic and treatment recommendations, however, is a challenge requiring a cultural 
shift from deeply entrenched values and practices in medicine.”). 
 46. The management literature has long recognized that an organization’s culture can be a 
strong influence in shaping the behaviors and beliefs of new hires. See, e.g., HIGGINS, supra note 
44; Dokko et al., supra note 38, at 55.  
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are the natural and effective tools by which Agency heads can convey 
their granting preferences.47 That is, the operation of the Agency’s 
quality-assurance initiatives is largely in the discretion of the 
Agency’s upper management, which would make them an attractive 
policy lever to effectuate a change in management’s views toward 
allowing or rejecting applications. If high-level management believes 
that the PTO is allowing too many low-quality patents, then it may 
choose to strengthen the Agency’s quality-assurance program by 
sending a signal to examiners that the PTO now values rejecting 
patents more than it did in the preceding years. Conversely, if high-
level officials at the Agency believe that the PTO is erroneously 
rejecting too many valid patents, they may weaken the quality-
assurance initiatives in order to correct for what they perceive to be 
an overly restrictive granting culture.48 Moreover, because quality-
assurance programs aimed at evaluating individual examiner behavior 
(and aimed at assisting in promotion decisions) have such a strong 
potential to redirect examiner practices, this particular policy tool has 
the potential to powerfully implement the directives of management. 
The rest of this Section utilizes variation in the nature of the 
PTO’s quality-assurance program to help map out three distinct 
regimes of the Agency’s “allowance culture” over the period ranging 
from 1993 to 2012: (1) a more permissive granting culture throughout 
the 1990s; (2) a less permissive granting culture in the mid- to late-
2000s; and (3) a more permissive granting culture in the 2010–2012 
period. We emphasize that these regimes are relative to one another. 
That is, we suggest only that the attitude of the Agency in the 1990s 
was more permissive with respect to granting than it was in the mid- 
to late-2000s. We do not attempt to classify these cultural eras relative 
to some normatively optimal benchmark. 
 
 47. Our interviews with patent examiners suggest that some believe a change in the 
allowance culture is effectuated through a top-down approach wherein high-ranking officials 
communicate a need for change in allowance culture to officials directly below them and 
wherein these officials further communicate these instructions to those below them, etc. 
Telephone Interview with Former Patent Exam’r No. 7, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (June 
30, 2015); cf. Frakes & Wasserman, Bad Patents, supra note 6, at 665 (discussing possible 
channels by which the PTO could favor certain patent types over others, including a top-down 
approach).  
 48. The Agency could also change the culture of allowance in an effort to address its 
growing backlog of patent applications. Because patent applicants can continuously refile 
rejected applications, allowing patents is the easiest way for the PTO to diminish or at least slow 
down the growth of its application backlog. See, e.g., Frakes & Wasserman, Bad Patents, supra 
note 6, at 616 (describing why a resource-constrained agency may allow additional patents in an 
effort to decrease its backlog).  
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The 1990s arguably represented a high water mark with respect 
to the Agency’s culture of allowance. At this time, the Agency not 
only infamously stated that its “primary mission” was “to help 
customers get patents,” but it also severely compromised much of its 
quality-assurance infrastructure.49 Generally speaking, the PTO’s 
quality-assurance efforts are implemented through two different 
mechanisms: quality-assurance reviews performed by the Office of 
Patent Quality Review and integrated quality reviews within each of 
the PTO’s nine technology centers (that is, large collections of 
examiners that review applications in the same general technological 
field).50 Since its inception in 1974, the Office of Patent Quality 
Review has randomly selected a sample of allowed applications and 
has conducted its own independent review of the applications to 
determine if the examiner properly decided the invention merited a 
patent.51 Decisions by high-ranking officials in the PTO, however, left 
the Office of Patent Quality Review largely ineffective for a 
substantial period of time in the 1990s. 
In 1990, the Inspector General relied on data from the Office of 
Patent Quality Review to fault the PTO for failing to reduce error 
rates.52 The Agency’s management responded by proposing to 
eliminate the Office of Patent Quality Review (and its evaluations) in 
favor of utilizing customers’ (that is, patentees’) satisfaction surveys 
as the PTO’s primary measure of examination quality.53 In 1993, the 
PTO began reducing the staff of the Office of Patent Quality Review 
to prepare for replacing the office with the “reengineered quality 
process.”54 By 1996 the PTO slashed the Office of Patent Quality 
Review in half, resulting in the office sampling only 2 percent of 
allowed applications, well below the 4 percent sampling rate the 
 
 49. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, CORPORATE PLAN—2001: PATENT BUSINESS 23 
(2001), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/corpplan/pt04.pdf [https://perma.cc/8SCX-VS69].  
 50. Historically, the integrated quality review was mainly comprised of supervisors 
reviewing the work of examiners, especially the work of junior examiners. In response to the 
1997 Inspector General Report, the PTO expanded integrated quality review to include some 
in-process review—i.e., quality review before an application was allowed. In 2000, the integrated 
quality review was further expanded for a small subset of applications directed toward business 
methods, in which all allowances were subjected to a mandatory second round of review. 
 51. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, REPORT NO. OIG-11-006-I, 
U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE PATENT QUALITY ASSURANCE PROCESS 2 (2011). 
 52. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, REPORT NO. PTD-9977-7-
0001, PATENT QUALITY CONTROLS ARE INADEQUATE 1–3 (1997). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 4. 
FRAKES AND WASSERMAN IN PRINTER FINAL (UPDATED PAGE NUMBERS) (DO NOT DELETE) 4/21/2016  3:36 PM 
2016] PATENT OFFICE COHORTS 1617 
Agency had determined was necessary to provide valid results.55 After 
the Inspector General criticized the Agency’s quality-assurance 
program in 1997, the PTO agreed to increase the Office of Patent 
Quality Review’s staff in order to provide statistically valid samples of 
allowed applications.56 Accordingly, both the compromised quality-
assurance program and the Agency’s own mission statement suggest 
that the PTO had a rather permissive allowance culture during the 
1990s. 
The PTO’s allowance culture arguably became less permissive in 
2002. At this time, the Agency proposed a series of enhanced-quality 
initiatives that both improved quality review at the Office of Patent 
Quality Review and integrated quality review within a technology 
center.57 These initiatives, which represented the most significant 
restructuring of the PTO’s quality-assurance program in over twenty-
five years, were largely implemented in the end of 2003 and 
throughout 2004 under Jon Dudas, then Director of the PTO.58 These 
quality-assurance initiatives included, among other things, an 
expansion of the Agency’s mandatory second-review program and the 
implementation of a certification program that required examiners to 
demonstrate examination proficiency periodically.59 Importantly, the 
Agency committed significant human resources to implement these 
initiatives, creating a series of new positions and more than doubling 
the number of individuals whose primary responsibility was to review 
 
 55. Id. The revamped survey-based evaluation process suffered delays and setbacks and 
never made it out of the pilot stage. Id. at 5–6. 
 56. Id. at 6–7. At this time the Agency also adopted the Inspector General’s suggestion to 
review first office actions—the first substantive evaluation of an application—rather than only 
allowed applications. ASSISTANT SEC’Y OF COMMERCE & COMM. OF PATENTS & 
TRADEMARKS, DRAFT RESPONSE TO DRAFT AUDIT REPORT NO. PTD-9977-7-XXXX: 
“PATENT QUALITY CONTROLS ARE INADEQUATE” 1, 3 (1997). 
 57. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
REPORT 2003, at 12 (2003) [hereinafter 2003 PERFORMANCE REPORT].  
 58. THOMAS H. STANTON ET AL., NAT’L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., U.S. PATENT AND 
TRADEMARK OFFICE: TRANSFORMING TO MEET THE CHALLENGES OF THE 21ST CENTURY 65 
(2005). These new quality initiatives, among other things, represented a shift in focus from the 
end-of-examination review to in-process examination review, as well as a push to use quality-
assurance results to improve individual examiner performance and improve training programs. 
2003 PERFORMANCE REPORT, supra note 57, at 2–3; U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 2004, at 3 (2004) [hereinafter 2004 
PERFORMANCE REPORT]. 
 59. The Agency first introduced this second review program in 2000 but only for allowed 
patents in class 705 of business methods. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, THE 21ST 
CENTURY STRATEGIC PLAN 9 (2003); 2004 PERFORMANCE REPORT, supra note 58. 
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the work of examiners.60 After the implementation of these new 
directives, the Agency’s grant rate dropped dramatically.61 Robert 
Budens, the president of the patent examiner union, remarked that 
these initiatives created an environment where examiners “started 
becoming fearful of allowing [applications] because you could run 
headlong into quality review problems that make life miserable.”62 
Thus, it appears that the PTO’s allowance culture had waned in the 
mid- to late-2000s, at least in comparison to the 1990s. 
The appointment of David Kappos as Director of the PTO in 
August 2009 arguably represents another shift in the Agency’s views 
toward allowing patents.63 Almost immediately upon starting as 
Director, Kappos addressed “the culture of rejection” that pervaded 
the office under Dudas by sending an email to all examiners stating, 
 
 60. STANTON ET AL., supra note 58, at 67 (noting that the agency created a director for the 
Office of Patent Quality and Assurance, review-quality specialists who conduct quality reviews 
and report to the Office of Patent Quality and Assurance, and twenty-two training quality-
assurance specialists resident in the Technology Center who conduct in-process quality reviews 
and report directly to the Technology Center Directors). In the late 1990s, full staffing of the 
Office of Patent Quality Review required sixteen reviewers. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra 
note 52, at 4.  
The result was four different types of quality review: the Office of Patent Quality Review 
continued to review examiner work of applications that were allowed while newly created 
training quality-assurance specialists conducted both second-pair-eyes-review for allowed 
applications in specific fields and random in-process reviews of examiners’ work after first office 
actions were completed, and focused on in-process reviews in response to supervisors’ requests. 
STANTON ET AL., supra note 58, at 67.  
 61. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 11 (2008) (statement of Jon W. Dudas, Under Secretary of 
Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director, United States Patent and Trademark Office) 
(highlighting that the Agency grant rate in 2007 was only 44 percent, nearly 30 percent lower 
than the allowance rate in the late 1990s); Terry Carter, A Patent on Problems, ABA J. (Mar. 10, 
2010, 11:40 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/a_patent_on_problems [http://
perma.cc/ 3UQF-U8ZE] (noting that Jon Dudas, who was Director of the PTO from 2004 to 
2008, stated, “We focused on quality with a number of new initiatives and the error rate came 
down . . . . We anticipated the allowance rate to come down, but didn’t think it would come 
down as much as it did”); see infra Table 1.  
 62. Carter, supra note 61 (noting that Robert Budens, president of the patent examiner 
union, stated “[t]he levels of review got ridiculous . . . . The allowance rate began to drop like a 
stone, in part from a larger fear created in the examining corps, and especially the supervisors 
who don’t want to get dinged on their performance”); Telephone Interview with Former Patent 
Exam’r No. 7, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (June 30, 2015) (noting that the Agency had a 
culture of rejection in the mid-2000s).  
 63. This is not to say there have not been changes to the incentive structure of examiners in 
efforts to increase patent quality. For instance, in 2010 the PTO changed the production 
schedule of examiners as well as the metrics utilized to review supervisors. See U.S. PATENT & 
TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 2010, at 16–17 (2010). 
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“Let’s be clear: Patent quality does not equal rejection.”64 During the 
end of 2009 and beginning of 2010, the PTO began to rectify what 
Kappos believed was examiners’ reluctance to allow patents by 
rolling back potentially ineffective quality-assurance initiatives—that 
is, abolishing the mandatory second-review program and reducing the 
certification program for examiners.65 In addition, in 2010 the Agency 
implemented initiatives to increase the effectiveness of patent 
prosecution, which it touted as increasing the PTO’s allowance rate 
while also increasing the quality of review.66 Thus, it appears that from 
2010–2012 the PTO’s allowance culture became more permissive. 
Hypothesis 2: All else being equal, patent examiners hired during 
a time period when the Agency had a more permissive allowance 
culture will have a higher grant rate throughout their careers than 
patent examiners hired during a time period when the Agency had a 
less permissive allowance culture. 
C. The PTO’s New-Hire Training Programs 
The preceding subsection predicts that the Agency’s allowance 
culture at the time an examiner was hired may have a lasting 
influence on how an examiner approaches the review of patent 
applications, including her granting proclivities. This Section posits 
that changes in the rigor and length of new-hire training programs at 
the PTO can amplify or attenuate the extent to which new cohorts of 
examiners adhere to the prevailing allowance culture of the Agency. 
Assuming that the PTO will promote its allowance philosophy—be it 
permissive or restrictive in nature—in its new-hire training programs, 
this Section posits that the longer a new patent examiner receives 
formal new-hire training, the more likely she is to become 
indoctrinated into the Agency’s prevailing allowance culture (at least 
that component of the Agency’s culture being propagated by central 
Agency heads). 
 
 64. Carter, supra note 61. 
 65. Telephone Interview with Steven Griffin, Senior Adviser for the Office of Comm’r for 
Patents (July 6, 2015).  
 66. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
REPORT 2009, at 14 (2009). Kappos also successfully reengineered the way examiners earn 
credits toward their production quotas by giving examiners more time to review patent 
applications. Id. at 3, 18. The PTO explained that this and other changes were meant to 
“[r]educe examiner reluctance to allow applications.” U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
JOINT LABOR & MGMT. COUNT SYS. TASK FORCE, OVERVIEW OF COUNT SYSTEM INITIATIVES 
AND CHANGES 3, 16 (Mar. 8, 2010) (on file with author).  
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The Section now turns to describing the two distinct new-hire 
training regimes of the PTO over the period of 1993 to 2012: (1) a 
very minimal formal training period before 2006 and (2) a robust 
formal training period during and after 2006. The PTO, like other 
organizations, requires its examiners to complete a series of training 
programs before they can begin routine evaluation of patent 
applications. Before 2006, the formal training of new patent 
examiners was rather modest. Newly hired patent examiners received 
only two to three weeks of formal, centralized training before they 
were assigned to an art unit.67 Upon assignment to an art unit, new 
hires immediately began to review actual patent applications, during 
which time the supervisor of the art unit provided additional informal 
training.68  
In 2006, the PTO dramatically changed how the Agency trained 
new patent examiners with the opening of the Patent Training 
Academy.69 The Patent Training Academy provided new patent 
 
 67. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-1102, U.S. PATENT AND 
TRADEMARK OFFICE: HIRING EFFORTS ARE NOT SUFFICIENT TO REDUCE THE PATENT 
APPLICATION BACKLOG 10 (2007). Examiners’ two weeks of formal training included an 
introduction to the software utilized by examiners and a brief primer on patents. ANNEMARIE 
L. M. FIELD, CONNOR MCGRATH & ELAINA NICHOLS, PATENT EXAMINER RECRUITMENT, 
PROJECT NUMBER: 45-HXA-0707, at 71 (Dec. 12, 2007), https://www.wpi.edu/Pubs/E-project/ 
Available/ E-project-121207-102952/unrestricted/USPTOFINALREPORT.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
YH 4Q-2DBU]. 
 68. FIELD ET AL., supra note 67, at 71. New examiners, like other examiners, also 
periodically received additional formal training. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 2002, at 101–03 (2002). 
Once new hires begin actually reviewing patent applications they are technically subject 
to production quotas like the other examiners in the examining corps are. However, production 
quotas are not generally enforced against new hires for the first year. Nevertheless, new hires 
are expected to demonstrate an increase in production with the general goal of meeting full 
production at approximately the one-year mark. Patent examiners also appeared to be hired 
under a probationary period for much of our sample period. This probationary period was two 
years for much of the early 2000s and one year in the late 2000s. Although production quotas 
are not technically utilized to determine the performance review of an examiner during her first 
year, they are used to determine who would be retained at the PTO. For instance, an examiner 
who was meeting only 50 percent of her production quota by near the end of her first year in 
terms of reviewing applications could be in jeopardy of being fired. Telephone Interview with 
Former Patent Exam’r No. 7, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (June 30, 2015); Telephone 
Interview with Current Patent Exam’r No. 6, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (July 2, 2015).  
 69. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
REPORT 2006, at 4 (2006). This transformation in training practices coincided with an expansion 
in the Agency, including hiring approximately 2,000 new examiners over a two-year period 
which increased the number of patent examiners by 50 percent, during which the Agency 
realized it was no longer feasible to saddle the majority of new-hire training on senior 
examiners. Id.; see also U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 2007–2012 STRATEGIC PLAN 6–7, 
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examiners with an eight-month, university-style formal training 
program and brought more uniformity and rigor to the training 
process.70 For the first two months, new hires attended large lectures 
that mimicked college courses in which they received training on laws 
and procedures associated with the examination of patent 
applications, and soft skills such as interpersonal and work-life skills.71 
After this initial two-month period, new hires began to work on 
actual patent applications from their home art units, in addition to 
attending lectures.72 At the end of the eight-month period, examiners 
transitioned fully into their home art units, where they subsequently 
received informal training from their supervisors. 
In 2006, however, not all new hires were subject to the 
redesigned training program. Approximately half of the 1,218 new 
patent examiners hired in 2006 received training through the new 
Patent Training Academy for up to eight consecutive months while 
the other half received training under the prior model—that is, two 
weeks of formal training before being assigned to their home art 
units.73 Selection for the more rigorous new-hire training depended 
upon the examiner’s technological specialty. That is, examiners who 
were hired based upon their backgrounds to review applications in 
certain fields, such as computer hardware and software, 
overwhelmingly received the more extensive new-hire training, 
whereas examiners who were hired to review other technologies, such 
as agriculture, food, and textiles, did not.74 Beginning in 2007, all new 
hires were subject to the enhanced new training program.75  
 
http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/web/offices/com/strat2007/stratplan2007-2012.pdf [http://
perma.cc/ 3FAF-8999].  
 70. Examiners that enter the Patent Training Academy are divided into subgroups 
comprising approximately sixteen examiners with similar scientific backgrounds to whom a 
primary trainer and an assistant trainer are assigned. FIELD ET AL., supra note 67, at 71.  
 71. Patent Examiner Positions, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://careers.uspto.
gov/Pages/PEPositions?Training.aspx [http://perma.cc/65QG-7D2Y]. 
 72. FIELD ET AL., supra note 67, at 71. 
 73. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
REPORT 2006, at 16–17 (2006). 
 74. The Appendix provides more details as to which technology areas examiners received 
the eight-month formal style training in 2006.  
 75. In 2010, the Agency made another change in its new training process. At this time, the 
Agency replaced the eight-month training program with two new initiatives. The first was a 
twenty-day training program for new examiners with at least one year of prior intellectual 
property experience. The second was a two-phased twelve-month program for new examiners 
without prior intellectual property experience. The two-phase twelve-month program differed 
from the previous eight-month training process in several respects. Most saliently, it decreased 
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Hypothesis 3: The longer the amount of time new patent 
examiners receive formal training, the more likely their grant rates will 
reflect the allowance culture of the PTO at the time they were hired. 
III.  DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
A. Data 
In order to establish the link between the granting styles of 
patent examiners and the hiring cohorts to which they belong, it is 
necessary to amass rich data on patent applications spanning enough 
time to be able to distinguish true cohort effects from other related 
but distinct determinants of granting practices—for example, the 
effect of gaining additional years of experience. To date, data rich 
enough to accomplish this task has generally been unavailable. In 
fact, most prior investigations into the determinants of examiner 
behavior have explored only issued patents.76 A sampling frame of 
this nature is incapable of capturing the key decision that an examiner 
must make: whether or not to grant the given patent application. 
Furthermore, when prior studies have actually used application-level 
data, they have done so only with respect to a subset of applications 
filed at one point in time,77 a metric which does not help to isolate 
true cohort effects of the sort envisioned by this Article. 
To overcome these deficiencies, we collected data on the nearly 2 
million utility-patent applications78 filed on or after March 2001 that 
were published by July 2012 from the PTO’s Patent Application 
Information Retrieval (PAIR) database.79 By the end of 2012, 49 
 
the time new examiners spend receiving formal training in the Patent Training Academy by half 
before examiners transitioned into their home art units. Examiners did, however, continue to 
periodically receive formal training at the Patent Training Academy for the first eight months 
after transitioning into their home art units. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra 
note 63, at 119–21. 
 76. See, e.g., Cockburn et al., supra note 9, at 19, 21; Lichtman, supra note 16, at 158; 
Ronald J. Mann, The Idiosyncrasy of Patent Examiners: Effects of Experience and Attrition, 92 
TEX. L. REV. 2149, 2158 (2014). 
 77. For instance, one of the few papers that does utilize application-level data considers 
only 10,000 applications filed in January 2001. Lemley & Sampat, supra note 15, at 817.  
 78. Utility patents protect the way an article is used and works. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 79. In November 2000, there was a change in the law that required newly filed patent 
applications to be published eighteen months after they were filed. See id. § 122(b). 
Applications abandoned within the first eighteen months of filing, id. § 122(b)(2)(A)(i), and 
applications wherein the applicant filed a special exemption to maintain confidentiality, are 
exempted from this requirement, id. § 122(b)(2)(B)(i):  
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percent of these applications had resulted in patents, 25 percent were 
not patented because they had been abandoned by the applicant,80 
and the remainder were still pending. Our study focuses on the 1.4 
million utility-patent applications filed from 2001 onward that 
received a final disposition—those that were granted or abandoned—
by July 2012. 
Though publicly available, the PAIR database is not readily 
suitable for a comprehensive analysis of the determinants of patent 
examiner granting practices considering that the data is divided into 
separate webpages for each individual application, with each webpage 
providing information via numerous tab delimited and portable 
document format (pdf) files. With help from the National Center for 
Supercomputing Applications at the University of Illinois, we 
amassed and coordinated the information provided by the more than 
one million distinct webpages. Importantly, these data include 
information on the outcome of the application process—that is, 
whether or not the application was granted—along with the identity 
of the patent examiner charged with reviewing the application. This 
latter data field allowed us to merge application outcomes with 
various characteristics of the examiner, including (1) the year in 
which the examiner was hired by the PTO (and if the examiner was 
hired in 2006, whether she received the eight-month or two-week 
formal new hiring training), (2) the experience (in years) of the 
examiner at the time of review of the application in question, and (3) 
the general schedule (GS) pay-grade level of the examiner at the 
moment of review. We collected information on these personnel-
related measures by filing various FOIA requests with the PTO. 
Though our application-level data only starts in 2001, we collected 
examiner roster information dating back to 1992, allowing us to 
 
Such applications are . . . absent from the PAIR database. When some or all of an 
applicant’s claims are not allowed by the Patent Office, the aggrieved party will 
sometimes file a continuation application. This application is given a new serial 
number and may be assigned to a different examiner. Continuation applications are 
treated as unique applications in the PAIR database. A related and now far more 
commonly used device, known as a Request for a Continued Examination (RCE), 
does not receive a new application serial number and effectively allows an aggrieved 
applicant to keep the application on the examiner’s docket for further prosecution. 
RCEs are not treated as new, unique filings in the PAIR database; rather, they are 
treated as a continuation in the prosecution of original applications.  
Frakes & Wasserman, Time Allocated, supra note 6 (manuscript at 3–4 n.3). 
 80. Applicants may abandon their applications for a number of reasons including the 
failure to overcome an examiner’s rejection, change in their research direction, and bankruptcy. 
Frakes & Wasserman, Time Allocated, supra note 6 (manuscript at 4). 
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nonetheless identify the distinct granting styles of those examiner 
cohorts starting in the 1990s.81 Finally, we treat the individual who did 
the majority of work on the application as the examiner charged with 
reviewing that application: (1) the non-signatory examiner, when both 
a non-signatory and an examiner with signatory authority are 
associated with an application, or (2) the signatory examiner, when 
only one examiner is associated with an application.82 
B. Summary Statistics 
In Table 1, we summarize the mean grant rate for each PTO 
cohort from 1992 to 2012, using the 2002–2012 PAIR data. As 
demonstrated, the mean granting rates of the hiring cohorts from the 
1990s are substantially higher than the hiring cohorts from the mid-
2000s, with a high of nearly 84 percent and a low of roughly 45 
percent for the 2010 cohort. Across most of the intervening cohorts, 
this decline in inherent granting tendencies appears gradual; however, 
the data evidence large drops in grant rates between the 2003 and 
2004 cohorts (registering an 8 percentage-point drop) and between 
the 2006 and 2007 cohorts (registering a 7 percentage-point drop). 
The mean grant rates then jump for the cohorts hired in 2011 and 
2012. To be clear, the grant-rate trend evidenced in Table 1 does not 
depict the mean grant rate of all of the observations disposed of in 
1993, 1994 and so forth. Rather, the rate indicated for 1993 represents 
the average grant rate applied by those examiners hired in 1993 over 
the full 10 years of applications disposed of in our 2002–2012 PAIR 
sample. 
These summary statistics suggest that for applications processed 
during the mid-2000s, the likelihood of success was far greater for 
applications assigned to examiners that started in the 1990s than for 
applications assigned to examiners who started in the mid-2000s. This 
observation, however, does not necessarily evidence a true cohort 
effect. That is, it does not provide compelling empirical support for 
the proposition that examiners develop practice styles during the first 
 
 81. We drop applications reviewed by those examiners who have been with the PTO since 
1992 and before to ensure that we can properly track all examiners’ experience lengths and 
starting dates; however, the analysis is not affected to the extent we simply view the pre-1993 
cohorts as one group (results available from the authors upon request).  
 82. Signatory authority is the authority, granted by the PTO, for examiners to represent the 
Agency and to sign their own work. Examiners work toward obtaining such authority once they 
have reached the rank of general pay schedule 13. Frakes & Wasserman, Time Allocated, supra 
note 6 (manuscript at 4–5). 
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year at the PTO that generally persist over the course of their careers 
at the Agency. After all, factors other than actual cohort dynamics 
may account for this observed pattern. For instance, it could be that 
individual examiners do not exhibit any stickiness in behavior but that 
overall grant rates are falling substantially over time. As the 
applications reviewed by more recent cohorts would only fall on the 
tail end of this overall decline in grant rates, it would not be surprising 
that these recent cohorts carry lower mean grant rates. As such, it is 
first necessary to estimate the relationship between grant rates and 
hiring cohorts while controlling flexibly for trends in overall grant 
rates over time. This is a task that is made possible by the fact that the 
sample of applications collected follows a number of overlapping 
cohorts over a reasonably long period of time (in other words, given 
that we observe multiple cohorts for any given examination year and 
multiple years of examination for any given cohort, it is possible to 
statistically disentangle the two). 
Of equally important concern is the need to distinguish cohort 
effects from experience effects, two related but distinct concepts. 
Both concepts capture mechanisms by which learning may shape 
granting practices; however, cohort effects focus on the early stages of 
learning and training, particularly on how initial hiring conditions 
may set a hiring cohort on a particular pathway. Some cohorts may 
start off on very permissive trajectories, whereas others start off on 
very restrictive trajectories. Once on their particular pathways, 
however, examiners may nonetheless undergo further longer-term 
developments as they spend more time with the Agency. For instance, 
examiners of all cohorts—whether those on high-grant-rate or low-
grant-rate pathways—may experience a common evolutionary 
process in which they all learn how to form more effective bases of 
rejections over time. We characterize these latter developments as 
“experience” effects. To be sure, the relationship between grant rates 
of patent applications and experience effects is important in its own 
right and, in fact, has been the subject of recent scholarship.83 In the 
present study, we aim to build on these prior efforts and focus 
attention on the importance of initial conditions and the 
entrenchment in practice styles that they carry, a phenomenon that 
 
 83. See id. (manuscript at 18–25) (finding that experience does not induce examiners to 
grant patents at a higher rate but that instead examiner’s grade level has explanatory power as 
to her grant rate); Lemley & Sampat, supra note 15, at 817 (finding that more experienced 
examiners have a higher grant rate than less experienced examiners). 
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carries with it a range of critical policy implications distinct from 
those pertaining to longer-term experience dynamics. 
Fortunately, having collected data that allows us to follow many 
cohorts over a long period of time, our analysis will likewise facilitate 
the simultaneous estimation of cohort and experience effects in 
explaining granting behaviors. For instance, though examiners from 
the late 2000 cohorts only have limited experience, we may look to 
the grant rates of the earlier cohorts during years when they likewise 
had similarly low levels of experience in order to help us derive 
common experience patterns while leaving some information by 
which to identify the separate tendencies of the cohorts themselves. 
Finally, we note that there may be other characteristics of the 
applications under investigation or other changes in hiring practices 
that may explain the simple summary statistics presented in Table 1. 
For instance, one might be concerned that more of the new hires in 
the mid-2000s were concentrated in certain technologies that are 
generally associated with lower grant rates, as compared to those 
hires from previous years. Accordingly, the empirical analysis below 
will attempt to disentangle cohort effects from technology effects and 
other application characteristics beyond experience and examination-
year effects. 
C. Methodology 
In the Appendix, we set forth in greater detail the precise 
empirical specification that we estimate in order to both test for the 
existence of cohort effects and to determine the nature and shape of 
such effects. In short, we consider the sample of individual 
applications from the PAIR database that were disposed of by July 
201284 and regress the incidence of the relevant application being 
 
 84. Though we begin collecting applications that were filed as of March 2001, our goal is to 
understand the determinants of the application being allowed or not. Few applications filed in 
2001 will reach a final disposition in that year. As such, we simply ignore any final dispositions 
we do observe in 2001 and focus our analysis on the applications disposed of between 2002 and 
2012. In the Appendix, we present robustness checks to account for some degree of sample 
imbalance that may arise through the timing of this analysis—e.g., by the fact that those 
applications that will be disposed of in the early years of this sample are those that reach a final 
disposition relatively quickly, whereas those disposed of in later years will represent a mix of 
applications of varying prosecution lengths. To achieve better balance, the robustness exercise 
conducted in the Appendix simply performs the analysis set forth below on a set of applications 
that all reach a final disposition within three years while only looking at dispositions between 
2004 and 2012, thereby ensuring that all applications in any given year of the sample are similar 
in terms of length of prosecution.  
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granted on a series of dummy variables indicating (1) the year in 
which the examiner associated with the application began working 
with the PTO—that is, cohort effects, (2) the year in which the 
application was disposed of—that is, year effects, (3) the number of 
years of experience of the associated examiner at the time of 
examination of the relevant application (specified in accordance with 
the experience-year groupings set forth in the Appendix to address 
the well-known econometric issues with simultaneously estimating 
year effects, cohort effects, and age/experience effects), (4) the GS-
level of the examiner, which we have previously shown is an 
important determinant of the grant rate of the examiner insofar as it 
bears on the amount of examination time at the examiner’s disposal,85 
(5) the technology category associated with the application,86 and (6) 
the maximum number of years the relevant examiner spends at the 
PTO—that is, the examiner’s “tenure”—which is of potential 
relevance to the extent that those who depart the office quickly are of 
inherently different dispositions relative to those who stay with the 
PTO for a long time.87 
 
 85. Frakes & Wasserman, Time Allocated, supra note 6 (manuscript at 9–10). 
 86. For these purposes, we use the thirty-seven technology sub-categories set forth by 
Bronwyn Hall and colleagues, see The NBER Patent-Citations Data File: Lessons, Insights, and 
Methodological Tools, in PATENTS, CITATIONS, AND INNOVATIONS: A WINDOW ON THE 
KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 403, 452–54 tbl.9 (Adam B. Jaffe & Manuel Trajtenberg eds., 2002). In 
the Appendix, we demonstrate the robustness of the findings to the alternative use of PTO 
Class groupings (which are more fine-grained). The inclusion of technology-category fixed 
effects forces us to test for the presence of cohort effects by looking at dynamics within given 
technologies. As such, this set of controls alleviates concerns that the estimated patterns of 
cohort effects can be explained by trends in the technological emphasis of hiring over time. In 
the Appendix, we take matters one step further and include technology-category-by-year fixed 
effects. This richer set of controls can account for concerns that the PTO may differentially hire 
in different fields over time and that each technology has its own idiosyncratic time trend in 
grant rates. For example, it could be that the Agency hires more within a particular technology 
in the mid-2000s—a technology that is generally associated with a low grant rate—but that this 
particular technology also has an especially low grant rate—relative to its mean—in the mid-
2000s for some reason unrelated to the learning and training dynamics of interest in this Article. 
Technology-by-year fixed effects allow for flexible trends in granting patterns over time within 
each technology, thereby alleviating any such concerns. As we are still observing multiple, 
overlapping cohorts of examiners over a long period of time within each separate technology, 
we can still impose technology-by-year fixed effects while retaining the ability to tease out the 
independent and general influence of the hiring year.  
 87. In robustness checks, we also control for certain additional characteristics of the 
underlying application, including (1) an indicator variable for whether the applicant is a large or 
small entity (as such terms are used to set application fees by the PTO), (2) the duration of the 
prosecution period, (3) an indicator variable for whether the application was previously filed at 
the EPO or JPO; and (4) an indicator variable for whether or not the applicant filed a request 
for continued examination during the prosecution of the application. 
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If cohort effects are not a real phenomenon—that is, if the 
pattern of declining mean grant rates by hiring cohort from Table 1 
can be explained by these other factors (for example, year, 
experience, tenure, or GS-level effects)—we would expect to observe 
few differences among the estimated coefficients of the cohort-year 
dummies. In other words, if one plotted the estimated cohort 
coefficients, they would stay roughly flat over time. For example, the 
effect of the examiner being in the 1993 cohort, all else being equal, 
would be roughly the same as the effect of the examiner being in the 
1994 cohort, the 1995 cohort, and so on and so forth. In Part IV, we 
will present results of this regression analysis and formally test for the 
presence of differences in granting tendencies across cohorts. 
Finally, the theory set forth in Part II also predicts that the 
nature of such effects (to the extent they exist) will be a function of 
certain conditions of the Agency at the time of hiring for the relevant 
cohort—for example, the culture of the Agency and the nature of 
examiner training. Accordingly, after having established that cohort 
effects exist as a general phenomenon, our final methodological step 
will test (via simple graphical observation) whether the pattern of 
cohort effects that we estimate via our regression analysis aligns with 
our priors regarding the evolution of training practices and granting 
culture. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics: Mean Grant Rates by Hiring Cohort 
Year, Based on Applications Disposed of Between 2002 and 2012 
 (1) 
Cohort Mean (Standard Deviation) 
  
1993 83.7 (36.9) 
1994 77.2 (42.0) 
1995 76.3 (42.5) 
1996 78.3 (41.2) 
1997 78.6 (41.0) 
1998 78.5 (41.1) 
1999 75.1 (43.3) 
2000 74.4 (43.7) 
2001 72.9 (44.4) 
2002 71.3 (45.2) 
2003 67.0 (47.0) 
2004 58.6 (49.3) 
2005 58.5 (49.3) 
2006 55.4 (49.7) 
2007 48.4 (50.0) 
2008 45.9 (49.8) 
2009 47.1 (49.9) 
2010 45.4 (49.8) 
2011 56.8 (49.5) 
2012 52.6 (49.9) 
IV. RESULTS 
This Part turns to testing the key hypotheses presented in Part II 
above. Generally, these hypotheses set forth that initial hiring 
conditions at the PTO impact the granting behavior of an examiner 
over the tenure of her career. 
A. Primary Results 
In Part II, we set forth the following testable hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: All else being equal, the year a patent examiner is 
hired by the Agency will impact the grant rate that she follows 
throughout the course of her tenure. 
In Figure 1, we present estimates of the coefficients of the 
cohort-year dummies from the regression described in Part III (the 
tabular regression results underlying this Figure are presented in the 
Appendix). These coefficients can effectively be interpreted as the 
trend in inherent grant rates across different cohorts of examiners 
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based on the year in which they are hired, where each point should be 
interpreted with reference to the 1993 cohort, whose grant rate is 
normalized at 0. For instance, the mean grant rate for the 2007 cohort 
is roughly 11 percentage points lower (or roughly 16 percent lower in 
light of an overall grant rate of 68 percent) than the mean grant rate 
of the 1993 cohort. Although the regression underlying these 
estimates includes controls for year effects, experience effects, GS-
level effects, tenure effects, and technology effects, we present only 
the coefficients of the cohort-dummy variables in Figure 1, which 
represent the measures of interest in this Article. 
Figure 1: Relationship Between Grant Rates and Hiring-Year Cohort 
of Associated Patent Examiner, Among Applications Disposed of 
Between 2002 and 2012, Controlling for Year Effects and Other 
Application and Examiner Characteristics 
 
 Note: This figure presents results from a regression of a dummy variable indicating a 
granted application on dummy variables representing the hiring year of the associated patent 
examiner. The dummy variable for the 1993 cohort is omitted, representing the reference group. 
The figure plots the estimated mean coefficients of the cohort effects only. Regressions include 
year fixed effects, examiner-experience effects, GS-level effects, examiner tenure effects, and 
technology effects. 
 
As above, if cohort dynamics were not an actual determinant of 
observed granting practices, one would predict a flat relationship 
across the various coefficients of cohort indicators. Figure 1 hardly 
fits this description, instead evidencing a strongly declining grant rate 
as we head into the cohorts of examiners hired in the mid-2000s and a 
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subsequent increase in granting tendencies as we view the cohorts at 
the very end of the sample. With an F-statistic of 9.54 on the 
estimated cohort effects, we can reject at beyond a 1 percent level of 
statistical significance the hypothesis that the estimated cohort effects 
are all jointly equal to 0—that is, that the grant rates do not differ 
across cohorts. Accordingly, we can conclude that the pattern 
estimated in Figure 1 is not merely a product of random noise, but 
instead evidences a true pattern of cohort dynamics. Moreover, the 
cohort effects we find are substantial. As noted above, examiners in 
the 1993 hiring cohort have a mean grant rate roughly 11 percentage 
points (or 16 percent) higher than those examiners starting in the late 
2000s. Thus, our findings are consistent with Hypothesis 1 in 
suggesting that the year that an examiner was hired will impact her 
grant rate throughout the course of her career. 
B. Explaining Direction of Cohort Effects 
In Part II, we set forth the following testable hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: All else being equal, patent examiners hired during 
a time period when the Agency had a more permissive allowance 
culture will have a higher grant rate throughout their careers than 
patent examiners hired during a time period when the Agency had a 
less permissive allowance culture. 
As discussed in Part II, the PTO generally had three distinct 
allowance cultures over the period of our study: (1) a more permissive 
allowance culture throughout the 1990s, (2) a less permissive granting 
culture throughout the mid- to late-2000s, and (3) a more permissive 
granting culture during the period of 2010–2012. These cultural shifts 
are reflected in overall year-by-year grant rates of the Agency, 
controlling for the variety of variables set forth in Part III. In Figure 
2, we present estimates of the coefficients of the year fixed effects that 
are included in the regression underlying Figure 1. Figure 2 
demonstrates that the grant rate of the entire examiner corps was 
trending downwards throughout the mid- to late-2000s, aligning with 
the less permissive granting culture throughout that time period,88 and 
 
 88. In our previous research, we stressed that the financial strain placed on the Agency 
over this decade may have incentivized it to grant patents at higher rates in order to generate 
additional fee revenue and/or to discourage the filing of costly continuation applications. See 
generally Frakes & Wasserman, Agency Funding, supra note 6; Frakes & Wasserman, Bad 
Patents, supra note 6. How can these previous arguments be reconciled with the present 
predictions of a decreasing grant-rate philosophy of the Agency over this time? As emphasized 
in our prior work, the grant rate may change from year to year due to stories unrelated to the 
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that the grant rate of the entire examiner corps reversed and trended 
upward in 2010, aligning with a more permissive granting culture in 
the 2010s. 
Figure 2. Relationship Between Grant Rates and Year of Disposition of 
Application, Among Applications Disposed of Between 2002 and 2012, 
Controlling for Cohort Effects and Other Application and Examiner 
Characteristics 
 Note: This figure presents the mean estimates of the coefficients of the year fixed effects 
that are included in the regression underlying Figure 1. 
 
 
fee- and continuation-related mechanisms of interest in that prior research. Although we did not 
specify as such during these prior articles, one unrelated story of this nature could be the desire 
of the Agency to improve the quality of its examination practices and to retreat from the 
customer-focused mentality of the previous decade. What this prior research effectively did then 
was to predict that financial considerations may have caused the Agency to hold back on 
pushing grant rates as low as it otherwise may have wanted absent such financial woes. 
Moreover, we predicted (and found evidence consistent with such predictions) that the Agency 
may have targeted this fee- or continuation-related granting bias on those types of applications 
that would deliver the Agency the largest payoff. As such, taking all of our research together, 
one can say that the Agency in the mid-2000s sought to generally depress the elevated grant 
rates it had been administering previously, but perhaps not as much in the case of those 
application types with respect to which elevated grant rates garner certain financial benefits for 
the Agency. 
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This Article’s primary focus, however, is not whether the 
Agency’s allowance culture affects the grant rate of the entire 
examiner corps—that is, year effects—but rather whether the PTO’s 
granting culture has a lasting effect on the allowance rate of 
examiners hired at that time—that is, cohort effects. In other words, 
we are interested in the degree to which temporal changes in the 
Agency’s culture and the Director’s communications have a long-
lasting impact on new hires’ granting proclivities. As suggested in Part 
III, we might predict that the estimated cohort effects fell when the 
Agency’s granting rhetoric took a restrictive turn in 2003/2004 with 
the roll out of a new patent-quality initiative. Consistent with the 
preliminary summary statistics set forth in Table 1 and discussed in 
Part III, the regression results depicted in Figure 1 align with these 
expectations. Relative to the 2002 cohort, the 2003 cohort exhibits a 
roughly 5 percentage-point drop in its mean grant rate. The mean 
grant rate of the 2004 cohort, in turn, drops a subsequent 1.5 
percentage points relative to the 2003 cohort. As such, not only are 
grant rates generally falling across all examiners as a result of these 
cultural shifts—which we demonstrate via the estimated year fixed 
effects presented in Figure 2—but the impact of the cultural 
developments is especially felt by the new cohorts of examiners 
entering the Agency at that time. All else being equal, the mean grant 
rates of these burgeoning cohorts—comprised of impressionable, 
fledgling examiners—are lower than that of previous cohorts. This is 
further demonstrated by the year-by-year granting trends from 2002–
2012 set forth in Figure 3. It compares, by way of example, a cohort 
emerging during the permissive 1993 regime with a cohort emerging 
during a more restrictive environment of the mid-2000s. Although the 
grant rates of the older cohorts did trend in the direction of these 
cultural shifts in the 2000s, they experienced this downward trend 
while nonetheless remaining at a higher general level than the 
emerging cohorts. That is, although the grant rates of the 1993 cohort 
are falling into the mid-2000s, once the mid-2000s cohorts enter the 
scene, they emerge with a grant rate that remains consistently below 
that of the 1993 cohort. 
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Figure 3: Year-by-Year Grant-Rate Trend over 2002–2012 for 1993 
Hiring Cohort (Permissive Culture) and 2005–2007 Hiring Cohorts 
(Restrictive Cultures) 
 
 Note: This figure compares annual grant rate trends for the first cohort in our records to 
three cohorts in the mid-1990s using data from the 2002–2012 PAIR database. 
 
As discussed in further detail in Part II, the 2010s were 
associated with a retreat of the restrictive culture of the mid- to late-
2000s and a return to a more permissive environment. Similarly, not 
only do we observe that grant rates generally increase across the 
board after this time (as depicted by the estimated year effects in 
Figure 2), but we also see from Figure 1 that the new cohorts of 
examiners at this time start their careers on a higher grant-rate 
pathway than those examiners who started in the mid-2000s. Due to 
the time period of our study, it is difficult to say for sure without 
having the benefit of foresight that these newer cohorts will maintain 
this more permissive disposition if the environment becomes more 
restrictive in the future. 
In the Appendix, we estimate regression specifications that 
group hiring cohorts into the three general bins characterized by the 
three relevant cultural regimes. This grouping better facilitates an 
assessment of the statistical significance of the above claims. 
Specifically, this exercise suggests that the downward trend in 
estimated cohort effects between the 1990s permissive era and the 
mid- to late-2000s restrictive era is indeed statistically significant (at 
the 1 percent level), as is the subsequent increase in cohort effects in 
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moving from the mid- to late-2000s to the post-2009 period (at the 5 
percent level in the full specification with individual application 
controls). 
C. Magnifying Effect of Examiner Training Intensity 
In Part II, we set forth the following testable hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: The longer the amount of time new patent 
examiners receive formal training, the more likely their grant rates will 
reflect the allowance culture of the PTO at the time they were hired. 
In other words, we further predicted that training has an 
amplification effect on the role of culture in shaping long-term 
practice styles. We first test this by looking at the new examiners 
hired in 2006, a time, again, characterized by the restrictive granting 
philosophy that was initially set forth in 2003–2004. Some of the new 
hires at this time received the same level of training—that is, the two-
week program described in Part II—that was offered to new hires in 
previous years. For these examiners, we may not predict much change 
in their inherent granting patterns—that is, in their cohort effect—
relative to the 2004 and 2005 cohorts. New hires in certain 
technological fields in 2006, however, were exposed to a novel, 
extensive training period that lasted eight months. In light of the 
substantially longer period of formal indoctrination in the prevailing 
culture of the Agency, we predict that the mean grant rate of this 
particular set of the 2006 cohort will fall even lower relative to the 
2004 and 2005 cohorts and to that portion of the 2006 cohort that was 
not subject to the new training program. The results presented in 
Figure 4 are consistent with this prediction. In this new figure, we 
modify the approach taken in Figure 1 to simply lay out two cohorts 
in 2006: one subject to the new training initiative and one subject to 
the prior training program.89 The 2006 cohort with extensive training 
has a mean grant rate that is 2.3 percentage points (or roughly 3.4 
percent) below the 2006 cohort that lacks the extensive formal 
training. To facilitate an assessment of the statistical significance of 
 
 89. Technology-fixed effects should address any concerns that the results are attributable 
to differences in grant-rate dynamics across technologies insofar as some technologies received 
the new training in 2006 and some did not. In alternative specifications presented in the 
Appendix, we show that these findings are robust to the alternative use of technology-by-year 
fixed effects. Although the PTO did not randomly assign examiners into the new training 
program, it appears as if they made these determinations on a technological basis. Given our 
ability to control for this assignment feature (i.e., technology), the residual separation into the 
new training group and the old training group can be viewed as effectively random.  
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this estimate, we estimate a specification in the Appendix that 
modifies the three-cohort-bin approach discussed above and breaks 
the mid- to late-2000s cohorts into four groups: (1) between 2003 and 
2006, (2) 2006 with the old training regime, (3) 2006 with the new 
training regime, and (4) between 2007 and 2009.90 This exercise 
demonstrates a statistically significant difference in mean grant rates 
over their careers between the 2006 cohorts with and without the new 
training program (at either a 10 percent or a 1 percent level of 
significance depending on the precise specification). 
Although only (roughly) half of the new hires in 2006 were 
subject to the extensive new training program, all new hires in 2007 
were subject to the eight-month training initiative. Accordingly, we 
further predict that the mean grant rate for the 2007 cohort, all else 
being equal, will fall even further relative to the prior cohorts. Figure 
4 is likewise consistent with this prediction. 
Accordingly, beyond demonstrating the general presence of 
cohort effects themselves (Hypothesis 1), the findings presented in 
Figures 1–4 also lend support to Hypotheses 2 and 3 and confirm that 
the nature of the estimated effects are consistent with what one would 
expect given the initial hiring conditions present in the relevant hiring 
years. 
  
 
 90. Using those specifications with separate effects for each cohort year is arguably not 
designed to conduct inference on the specific hypotheses posed by this Article, which do not 
predict particular differences in cohort effects for each hiring year, but instead make predictions 
across a coarser set of hiring years—for example, 1990s cohorts versus mid-2000s cohorts. Using 
the standard errors from specifications with cohort effects for each hiring year is perhaps 
unnecessarily taxing.  
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Figure 4: Estimation of Cohort Effects, Separating the 2006 Cohort 
into an Old-Training 2006 Cohort and a New-Training 2006 Cohort 
 
 Note: This figure modifies Figure 1 to divide the 2006 cohort into two groups: one of 
which was subject to the eight-month training program and one of which was subject to the prior 
two-week training program. The 2006 cohort with the old training program is marked by the 
first vertical dashed line from the left. The 2006 cohort with the new training program is marked 
by the second vertical dashed line from the left. 
D. Caveats 
Finally, we should note an important caveat to our analysis. It is 
possible that the documented cohort effects may be explained by 
fluctuations over time in the type of individuals the PTO hires as 
examiners—for example, in the mid-1990s, the PTO happened to hire 
examiners that entered their positions with an inherently restrictive 
granting philosophy, even before receiving any training. Such an 
explanation would differ from the hypothesized story in which early 
periods of training shape enduring granting philosophies and in which 
fluctuations in Agency culture over time leave examiners of different 
hiring cohorts on separate trajectories. Nevertheless, we believe there 
are several reasons why our results are more consistent with the latter 
than the former. 
To start, our analysis does control for some fluctuations in the 
type of patent examiners hired. For instance, technology-fixed effects 
included in our base specification control for fluctuations in the 
PTO’s technological-hiring preferences from year to year. 
Technological shifts in hiring aside, it is conceivable that the 
underlying pool of new hires changes as a function of the strength of 
the overall labor market. That is, in the years when the 
unemployment rate is high and the Agency faces less labor 
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competition from industry, it is possible that the PTO hires new 
examiners that are on average more competent. One might argue that 
examiners with greater competency may be more effective at finding 
and articulating bases of rejections and thus enter the PTO with a 
lower baseline granting proclivity than patent examiners hired in 
years when the unemployment rate is low and the PTO faces tighter 
labor competition from industry. While plausible, we do not think it is 
likely that our findings may be explained by fluctuations of this 
nature in the labor market for several reasons. 
First, changes in the unemployment rate do not generally align 
with observed changes in the granting proclivities of patent office 
cohorts in the way predicted by this alternative theory.91 For instance, 
the unemployment rate was trending downwards from 1993 to 2001, 
but cohort effects are largely flat during this time period. Likewise, 
the unemployment rate was trending downwards in the mid-2000s 
(from 2003 to 2008), despite our observation of falling—not rising—
cohort effects over this time period. Second, the results presented in 
Figure 4 support the contention that the promulgation of Agency 
culture through examiner training—not changes in labor markets—is 
driving the granting proclivities of patent office cohorts. That is, the 
fact that differences in the granting proclivities of examiners hired in 
2006 can be explained in part by whether these examiners were 
subjected to eight months of formal new hiring training or two weeks 
of formal new hiring training cannot be explained by labor markets—
all examiners hired during 2006 were part of the same labor market 
pool. The presence of credible training effects of this nature lends 
greater credibility to the remaining findings as stemming from a story 
in which early periods of training shape durable practice styles and in 
which variations over time in top-down views over the proper 
application of patentability standards determine variations in practice 
styles across cohorts. 
Finally, Figure 3 further supports this cohorts interpretation of 
the results in lieu of the labor market alternative. As examiners from 
the permissive cohorts of the 1990s proceeded into the mid-2000s—at 
which time the Agency began calling for more restrictive practices—
they did indeed begin to grant at lower rates. The argument raised in 
this Article—as supported by Figure 3—is that these reductions in 
 
 91. See Unemployment Rate, Databases, Tables & Calculators by Subject, BUREAU OF LAB. 
STATS., U.S. DEP’T OF LAB. (Jan. 27, 2016, 9:40 AM), http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/ LNS1400 00
00 [http://perma.cc/4EBP-W7C9].  
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rates were not as strong as they might have otherwise been absent the 
hypothesized stickiness in examiner behavior (and thus did not go as 
low as the rates of the cohort of new hires at that time). If the pattern 
of cohort effects depicted in Figure 1 were to be explained by 
fluctuations over time in the strength of the labor market, one would 
not predict to observe any reductions in grant rates by the permissive 
cohorts over this mid-2000s time period. 
V.  IMPLICATIONS 
The above analysis demonstrates that the year in which an 
examiner is hired by the PTO has a lasting effect on her granting 
proclivities. The extent and direction of such cohort effects depends 
on various conditions of the PTO at the time of hiring. Our analysis 
intimates that the Agency’s allowance culture and new-hire training 
play a potentially significant role in setting a cohort’s baseline 
granting behavior. All else being equal, examiners that are hired in a 
year in which the PTO’s allowance culture was more permissive 
generally manifest a higher grant rate than examiners hired when the 
Agency’s allowance culture was less permissive. In addition, 
examiners subject to more intense formal new-hire training adhere 
more closely to the prevailing allowance culture of the Agency in 
developing their granting style than examiners subject to less intense 
formal new-hire training. This part begins to explore the implications 
of our results for both patent policy and administrative law more 
generally. 
A. Patent Policy 
With respect to patent policy, our results are relevant to the 
ongoing debates about patent quality—often expressed as a concern 
over the allowance of invalid patents—and about inconsistent 
patentability determinations across examiners. As an initial matter, 
our analysis suggests that more attention should be paid to cohort 
effects when discussing these critical policy considerations. If the PTO 
wants to effectuate change in the Agency’s culture, including patent-
quality culture, it may need to direct more resources to certain 
cohorts than others. At the least, it should acknowledge that the 
presence of overlapping cohorts may limit the degree to which it can 
achieve certain outcomes. Likewise, if the PTO wishes to better 
harmonize examiner decisionmaking, it should recognize the 
fundamental differences in how examiner cohorts exercise their 
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discretion and tailor its initiatives in part by the year examiners are 
hired. 
Importantly, while demonstrating the role of cohort effects in 
potentially interfering with the desire of Agency leaders to effectuate 
change at the PTO at any particular point in time, the analysis also 
suggests that current Agency leaders might wish to consider the 
lasting effect of their short-term decisions on the future Agency. For 
instance, consider a PTO that wishes to espouse a restrictive 
approach to granting patents but that is under budgetary constraints 
that limit its ability to conduct a robust training program at the 
present time. Given its budgetary woes, this Office may wish to cut 
back on its training expenses in an effort to align costs with expenses, 
believing that it may be able to put the examiners corps back on track 
at a later date. Our results suggest that its ability to correct matters 
down the road may be more difficult than the Agency originally 
believed, because examiners hired during the budgetary shortfall may 
continue, in future years, to follow whatever styles they developed 
during this initial period—a period characterized by a non-robust 
training program. The PTO may ultimately have to commit more 
resources than initially envisioned at a later date to redirect the 
practice of examiners who received the non-robust new-hire training. 
Understanding the potential additional costs associated with cohort 
dynamics may change the Agency’s cost-benefit analysis as it 
considers what policy initiatives to adopt. 
Our results also have implications for the literature that 
delineates inter-examiner disparity in PTO outcomes.92 Our results 
suggest that the prevailing account that there are “as many patent 
offices as there are patent examiners” is incomplete and 
oversimplifies the current state of affairs.93 Most saliently, our results 
suggest that a substantial portion of heterogeneity among examiners’ 
application outcomes is not simply idiosyncratic to individual 
examiners, but instead is driven by cohort effects.94 Thus, although the 
prior literature’s analysis may be helpful in encouraging 
commentators not to overlook the role of individual examiner 
heterogeneity in understanding the determinants of patent grants, our 
 
 92. See note 16 and accompanying text. 
 93. See Cockburn et al., supra note 9, at 21. 
 94. In a statistical exercise outlined in the Appendix, we find that roughly 20 percent of 
variation in grant rates among examiners can be explained by individual examiner-fixed effects 
alone. We also find that 20 percent of the variation in examiner-fixed effects are explained by 
the cohorts to which the examiner belongs.  
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analysis takes matters one step further by urging analysts not to 
overlook the role of hiring cohorts in understanding what it is about 
examiners that may be driving this heterogeneity. Recognizing that 
the PTO is not comprised of examiners who make haphazard 
decisions without substantial guidance from high-ranking officials, but 
instead that examiner behavior is heavily shaped by Agency heads 
through the environmental conditions of the Agency at hiring, likely 
has additional payoffs. For instance, one of us has previously argued 
that the prevalence of the overly simplified haphazard-examiner 
account has resulted in the literature’s failure to appreciate the 
Agency’s practical effect on the development of substantive patent 
law.95 
B. Administrative State 
Beyond patent policy, our results also have implications for the 
administrative state more generally. The administrative-law literature 
has long recognized that agencies are not monolithic actors but 
instead are governed by complex internal decisional dynamics that 
influence institutional outcomes.96 Yet, the administrative-law 
scholarship has not fully appreciated the role that cohort effects may 
play on agency decisionmaking, especially across a temporal 
dimension. 
As discussed above, cohort effects can inhibit current agency 
leaders in effectuating policy changes while also acting to entrench 
current policy into the future. That is, cohort effects raise the costs of 
changing agency policy both contemporaneously and prospectively. 
As a result, cohort effects, like the well-known “midnight” 
regulations, provide agencies with another mechanism to entrench 
policy horizontally across time.97 The study of cohort effects could 
thus help us better understand the strategies that are available to 
agencies seeking to achieve their interests. This is especially true in 
 
 95. Melissa F. Wasserman, The PTO’s Asymmetric Incentives: Pressure to Expand 
Substantive Patent Law, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 379, 388 (2011). 
 96. For a discussion on the internal agency decisionmaking process, see generally 
ANTHONY DOWNS, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY (1964); JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT 
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO IT (1989).  
 97. See Jack M. Beermann, Presidential Power in Transitions, 83 B.U. L. REV. 947, 969 
(2003); Anne Joseph O’Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of the 
Modern Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889, 891–92 (2008). Scholars have also recognized 
how self-regulation can serve as an entrenchment mechanism. See Elizabeth Magill, Agency 
Self-Regulation, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 859, 888 (2009). 
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light of the fact that cohort effects have several features that make 
them distinct from other ways in which an agency may choose to 
insulate its policy decisions from change. Perhaps most saliently, 
cohort effects are less transparent than other tools by which an 
agency may entrench its policy preferences against a future agency. In 
contrast to entrenching policy by promulgating a legislative rule 
interpreting the agency-administered statute before a regime change, 
an agency may simply alter the training of its new employees to 
ensure that certain types of its policy preferences have some staying 
power. Cohort effects will then amplify the consequences of these 
policies by providing a vehicle in which the effects of the policy will 
continue to be appreciated even after the policy itself has been 
terminated.98 
Additionally, a better understanding of cohort effects can help to 
provide insight into the effectiveness of agency monitors. Congress 
and the President have a variety of mechanisms with which they can 
attempt to control agencies, including restricting the agency’s budget 
and removing the agency’s high-ranking officials.99 Cohort effects can 
help to increase our understanding about the effectiveness of these 
external controls on agencies. As we have already discussed, cohort 
effects can potentially blunt the ability of political principals or the 
future agency to influence and control the agency’s behavior. 
Whether this is a normatively desirable outcome necessarily depends 
upon one’s view of administrative governance. Those who prize 
accountability would likely find an agency’s ability to diminish 
political controls troubling. Conversely, those who value agency 
autonomy would likely view the constraint of political process 
controls as a positive outcome. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the general agreement that the PTO allows too many 
low-quality patents and that its patentability decisions are 
inconsistent across examiners, there exists little compelling evidence 
as to what features of the system affect the Agency’s granting 
behavior. As a result, policymakers have been trying to fix the patent 
 
 98. As noted earlier, cohort effects may be large in magnitude especially when employees 
wield substantial discretion in performing their work functions.  
 99. Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 
89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 42–44 (2010); Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Future of 
Agency Independence, 63 VAND. L. REV. 599, 610 (2010).  
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system without understanding all of the root causes of its dysfunction. 
This Article contributes to recent efforts by the Authors to rectify this 
deficiency in the literature by exploring whether the year an examiner 
was hired may help explain her granting proclivities. We find strong 
evidence that hiring cohort effects do exist. Moreover, we find that 
changes in PTO cohorts’ granting behavior align with changes in the 
Agency’s culture and new hiring training programs. Our results 
provide insight into pressing issues of patent policy. For instance, if 
agency leaders want to diminish the degree of heterogeneity in patent 
office outcomes across examiners, they might face at least some 
degree of friction in light of the stickiness of examiner behavior. That 
is, because agency culture and environment at the beginning of an 
examiner’s employment may have an enduring effect on an 
examiner’s granting style, a PTO that seeks to achieve such objectives 
may need to tailor its policies to address differences in examiner 
cohorts. Our results also provide insight into topics that have long 
been of interest to scholars of the administrative state. Because 
cohort effects raise the costs of changing agency policy today and in 
the future, understanding how cohort dynamics work to entrench 
agency policy over time also provides insight into the effectiveness of 
agency monitors and the strategies available for an agency to achieve 
its interests over a long-term horizon. 
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APPENDIX 
I.  EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION 
To test for the presence (and direction) of hiring-year cohort 
effects, we estimate the following specification on the PAIR sample 
described in Part III: 
ࡳࡾ࡭ࡺࢀ௔௜௧ = 	ࢻ +	ૃ௧ + ૒௞ + ઺ଵ۱۽۶۽܀܂௜ + ઺ଶ۳܆۾۳܀௜௧
+ ઺ଷ۵܁௜௧ + ઺ସ܂۳ۼ܃܀۳௜ + ઺ହ܆௔௜௧ + ઽ௔௜௧ 
(1) 
In this equation, a indexes the individual application, i indexes the 
individual examiner, k indexes the technology associated with the 
application, and t indexes the year in which the application is 
disposed of by the examiner. ࡳࡾ࡭ࡺࢀ௔௜௧ indicates whether or not the 
given application was allowed by the examiner. Year-fixed effects are 
captured by ૃ௧. ۵܁௜௧ represents a set of dummy variables capturing 
the incidence of the examiner assigned to the underlying application 
falling into each of the general schedule (GS) pay-grade levels. ۵܁௜௧ 
also includes separate categories for GS-13 without partial signatory 
authority and GS-13 with partial signatory authority. ۳܆۾۳܀௜௧ 
captures a set of dummy variables for the incidence of the relevant 
examiner falling into a range of experience-level categories, where 
experience captures the number of years at the time of the 
application’s disposition that the relevant examiner has been with the 
PTO (the specification of the experience ranges is discussed further 
below). Further, we include a set of technology-fixed effects, ૒௞, using 
the thirty-seven technology subcategories set forth by Bronwyn Hall 
and colleagues100 (in other specifications, we include a set of 
technology-by-year fixed effects). Other specifications include various 
individual characteristics of the applications, ܆௔௜௧, including the 
entity-size status of the applicant (large versus small) and the foreign-
priority status of the application (previous filings at the European 
Patent Office and the Japan Patent Office). 
 
 100. Bronwyn H. Hall, Adam B. Jaffe & Manuel Trajtenberg, The NBER Patent-Citations 
Data File: Lessons, Insights, and Methodological Tools, in PATENTS, CITATIONS, AND 
INNOVATIONS: A WINDOW ON THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 403, 452–54 tbl.9 (Adam B. Jaffe 
& Manuel Trajtenberg eds., 2002). 
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II.  EXPERIENCE GROUPINGS 
As explained extensively in our prior work,101 estimating 
cohort/individual effects in the face of both time/year effects and 
age/experience effects poses certain econometric challenges due to 
the well-known identity: “age + cohort = year.” In other words, if one 
is looking at a given application and trying to understand what factors 
determine the outcome of that application and one knows the hiring 
year of the examiner in question and the number of years of 
experience of the examiner in question at the time of disposal, then 
one already has the information needed to understand what effect the 
year of disposal has on the outcome of that application. How? 
Because the year of disposal can immediately be gleaned from 
knowing the precise hiring year and the precise number of years of 
experience.  
As such, it becomes hard to disentangle the separate 
contributions of the experience of the examiner, the cohort of the 
examiner, and the year of the disposal of the application—an exercise 
we would like to do, considering that we are trying to isolate cohort 
effects and distinguish them from experience effects and general time 
trends. As we have discussed previously, researchers in these 
contexts, provided they have a rich data source covering many years 
of data with many overlapping cohorts, can attempt to achieve the 
necessary separation by breaking the identity (age + cohort = year) 
through the imposition of at least some additional normalization 
restriction. Commonly, researchers will impose the necessary 
restriction by grouping age/experience into bins—e.g., 0–1 years, 2–3 
years, 4–5 years, and so on and so forth. By imposing such 
restrictions, the researchers may retain some information by which 
they can isolate individual hiring-year cohort effects. Consider, for 
instance, an application disposed of in 2002 by examiners hired in 
1997 and 1998. At this time, they have 4–5 years of experience. If we 
tried to separately identify effects for 2002 disposals by examiners 
with 4 years of experience (1998 hiring year) and 5 years of 
experience (1997 hiring year), we could not do so for the above-stated 
reasons. However, by grouping the experience effects into a 4–5 year 
bin and estimating a mean effect for that bin, we retain some 
information by which to separately identify a 1997 cohort effect and a 
1998 cohort effect (by looking at deviations from the 4–5 year 
 
 101. See generally Frakes & Wasserman, Time Allocated, supra note 6. 
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experience mean). There is a cost to this approach, of course, in that 
it implicitly assumes that the fact of gaining 4 years of experience has 
an effect common with the fact of gaining 5 years of experience, when 
in fact they may have different effects. 
It should be emphasized that normalization restrictions other 
than grouping into 2-year bins are also employed by researchers to 
break the “age + cohort = year” identity, for instance, grouping 
age/experience into a 0–1 year bin and then estimating individual age 
effects thereafter, or using individual age/experience effects up to 
some point and then censoring at some age and grouping all 
individuals above that age into one group. In our Article we take this 
latter approach, including separate dummy variables for examiners 
who have 0, 1, 2 . . . 9 years of experience and then including a 
dummy variable to indicate examiners with 10+ years of experience. 
Because examiners falling into this 10+ years of experience group 
spans a range of hiring years in our sample and a range of disposal 
years, we are able to use these examiners to provide substantial 
information to identify hiring-year and disposal-year effects (without 
burdening us with separately identifying the various experience-year 
effects beyond 10 years), providing us with some relief by which we 
can separately identify individual experience effects for younger 
experience levels. For instance, consider again applications reviewed 
in 2002 by examiners starting in 1997 and 1998. Because we have 
already specified experience levels in a way to truly break the “age + 
cohort = year” identity (by grouping people with 10+ experience 
years together), we have the ability elsewhere in the model to provide 
information about the effect of 2002 disposals and the effect of 1997 
and 1998 hiring years. We now have greater flexibility to use the 
information from this particular set of applications to separately 
identify the effect of 4 years of experience and 5 years of experience. 
A benefit of achieving the necessary normalization restriction by 
grouping together experience years beyond some censoring point at 
the end of the experience distribution is that we may better estimate 
the independent effects of early experience years. This may prove 
useful given our desire to separate cohort effects from experience 
effects near the end of our sample period (where experience is 
naturally limited for new hires), a period of time where we attempt to 
make one important inference—i.e., that the post-2009 cohorts have 
higher granting tendencies than earlier cohorts. 
Nonetheless, in this Appendix, we demonstrate the general 
robustness of the main results to alternative normalization 
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restrictions. In Figure A1, we replicate Figure 1 of the text but group 
experience levels into 2-year bin dummies in the underlying 
regression. The results demonstrate even stronger declines in mean 
grant rates as cohorts age from the 1990s to the mid-2000s. This 
figure, however, demonstrates a weaker increase in cohort means for 
the post-2009 period. As above, however, with coarser experience 
groupings of this nature, it is perhaps more difficult with this 
specification to separate cohort effects from experience effects at the 
end of the sample. 
Figure A1: Relationship Between Grant Rates and Hiring Year Cohort 
of Associated Patent Examiner with Alternative Treatment of 
Experience Groupings 
 
 Note: This figure replicates that of Figure 1, except that the experience group dummies 
included in the regression are grouped into 2-year bins. 
  
-0
.3
0
-0
.2
0
-0
.1
0
0.
00
G
ra
nt
 R
at
e 
at
 C
oh
or
t
R
el
at
iv
e 
to
 1
99
3 
C
oh
or
t
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Cohort Year
FRAKES AND WASSERMAN IN PRINTER FINAL (UPDATED PAGE NUMBERS) (DO NOT DELETE) 4/21/2016  3:36 PM 
1648 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:1601 
III.  TABULAR REGRESSION RESULTS 
Table A1: Relationship Between Grant Rates and Hiring Year Cohort 
of Associated Patent Examiner 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Omitted: 1993 Cohort — — — — 
1994 Cohort Dummy -0.008 (0.019) 
-0.011 
(0.019) 
-0.002 
(0.015) 
-0.007 
(0.021) 
1995 Cohort Dummy 0.003 (0.018) 
-0.000 
(0.018) 
-0.010 
(0.015) 
0.008 
(0.019) 
1996 Cohort Dummy 0.011 (0.015) 
0.008 
(0.015) 
0.016 
(0.013) 
0.011 
(0.016) 
1997 Cohort Dummy 0.006 (0.021) 
0.002 
(0.020) 
-0.001 
(0.017) 
0.004 
(0.022) 
1998 Cohort Dummy 0.021 (0.018) 
0.017 
(0.018) 
0.010 
(0.016) 
0.019 
(0.020) 
1999 Cohort Dummy -0.002 (0.018) 
-0.007 
(0.018) 
-0.011 
(0.016) 
-0.006 
(0.020) 
2000 Cohort Dummy 0.010 (0.020) 
0.006 
(0.019) 
-0.014 
(0.018) 
0.006 
(0.022) 
2001 Cohort Dummy 0.010 (0.020) 
0.005 
(0.020) 
-0.005 
(0.017) 
0.004 
(0.022) 
2002 Cohort Dummy 0.009 (0.020) 
0.002 
(0.020) 
-0.014 
(0.018) 
0.004 
(0.022) 
2003 Cohort Dummy -0.048** (0.023) 
-0.054** 
(0.022) 
-0.058*** 
(0.020) 
-0.048** 
(0.025) 
2004 Cohort Dummy -0.063*** (0.023) 
-0.070*** 
(0.022) 
-0.077*** 
(0.020) 
-0.059** 
(0.025) 
2005 Cohort Dummy -0.056** 
(0.022) 
-0.064*** 
(0.022) 
-0.079*** 
(0.020) 
-0.049** 
(0.024) 
2006 Cohort Dummy -0.074*** (0.023) 
-0.083*** 
(0.022) 
-0.103*** 
(0.021) 
-0.067*** 
(0.025) 
2007 Cohort Dummy -0.110*** (0.024) 
-0.122*** 
(0.023) 
-0.124*** 
(0.022) 
-0.099*** 
(0.026) 
2008 Cohort Dummy -0.118*** (0.027) 
-0.129*** 
(0.026) 
-0.141*** 
(0.024) 
-0.101*** 
(0.028) 
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2009 Cohort Dummy -0.107*** (0.026) 
-0.122*** 
(0.026) 
-0.129*** 
(0.024) 
-0.091*** 
(0.028) 
2010 Cohort Dummy -0.098*** (0.028) 
-0.119*** 
(0.027) 
-0.130*** 
(0.026) 
-0.077*** 
(0.030) 
2011 Cohort Dummy -0.033 (0.033) 
-0.055* 
(0.033) 
-0.066** 
(0.031) 
-0.008 
(0.035) 
2012 Cohort Dummy -0.036 (0.033) 
-0.054* 
(0.032) 
-0.074** 
(0.030) 
-0.007 
(0.034) 
N 1148154 1148154 1148154 1014155 
F statistic on Joint 
Significance of Cohort 
Dummies 
9.24 10.20 10.14 6.67 
P-value of F-test on Joint 
Significance of Cohort 
Dummies 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Technology Dummies 
(Hall et al. Categories)? YES NO NO YES 
Technology-by-Year 
Dummies? NO YES NO NO 
Technology Dummies 
(PTO Classes)? NO NO YES NO 
Individual Application 
Covariates? NO NO NO YES 
Examiner Grade Level 
Dummies? YES YES YES YES 
Examiner Experience 
Group Dummies? YES YES YES YES 
Examiner Tenure Group 
Dummies? YES YES YES YES 
Disposal Year Fixed 
Effects? YES YES YES YES 
* Significant at 10 percent. ** Significant at 5 percent. *** Significant at 1 percent. 
        Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered to 
correct for autocorrelation within given examiners over time. Each observation is 
a given application from the PAIR database that reached a final disposition and 
that was published in the PAIR records between March 2001 and July 2012. 
Individual application covariates in Column (4) include an indicator for the 
entity-size status of the applicant (large or small entity) and an indicator for 
whether or not the application has foreign priority (whether it was previously 
filed at the European Patent Office or Japan Patent Office).  
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IV.  SAMPLE BALANCE 
One concern with the primary specification is that the 
applications reviewed by examiners hired at the end of the sample 
will generally be of the sort that are disposed of quickly by the PTO, 
whereas those applications reviewed by the older cohorts may have 
been disposed of over a range of durations, bearing in mind that the 
average application in our sample spends nearly three years in 
prosecution. Accordingly, despite random assignment of applications 
to examiners, one may be concerned with the potential for some 
degree of imbalance in the applications that we are assessing across 
the different cohorts.  
To alleviate this concern, we estimate specifications that 
condition the sample on applications that were prosecuted to 
disposition within 2 years, regardless of whether we are observing an 
older hiring cohort or a newer hiring cohort. To achieve balance in 
the recent years, we drop those examiners hired in 2012 from this 
specification because they will not have had the opportunity to 
examine applications in the 1+ year duration range. We also drop 
observations disposed of in 2002, because those applications will also 
represent (for all cohorts) quickly processed applications, to the 
extent that the PAIR sample under investigation starts with 
applications filed on or after March 2001. As demonstrated by Table 
2, the results are robust for this alternative exercise. The findings hold 
when conditioning the sample on applications reaching disposition 
within 3 years, dropping both applications disposed of in 2002 and 
2003, and applications reviewed by examiners hired in 2011 and 
2012—for the reasons just identified (see Table A2). 
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Table A2: Relationship Between Grant Rates and Hiring Year Cohort 
of Associated Patent Examiner, Balanced Sample Approach 
 (1) (2) 
Omitted: 1993 Cohort — — 
1994 Cohort Dummy 0.012 (0.016) 
-0.002 
(0.019) 
1995 Cohort Dummy 0.001 (0.019) 
0.001 
(0.019) 
1996 Cohort Dummy 0.016 (0.014) 
0.007 
(0.015) 
1997 Cohort Dummy 0.017 (0.020) 
0.010 
(0.021) 
1998 Cohort Dummy 0.013 (0.018) 
0.015 
(0.019) 
1999 Cohort Dummy -0.013 (0.019) 
-0.013 
(0.019) 
2000 Cohort Dummy 0.001 (0.021) 
-0.013 
(0.021) 
2001 Cohort Dummy -0.011 (0.022) 
-0.022 
(0.022) 
2002 Cohort Dummy -0.019 (0.022) 
-0.033 
(0.021) 
2003 Cohort Dummy -0.051* (0.030) 
-0.080*** 
(0.027) 
2004 Cohort Dummy -0.094*** (0.029) 
-0.098*** 
(0.026) 
2005 Cohort Dummy -0.089*** (0.027) 
-0.094*** 
(0.025) 
2006 Cohort Dummy -0.103*** (0.029) 
-0.120*** 
(0.026) 
2007 Cohort Dummy -0.164*** (0.031) 
-0.190*** 
(0.028) 
2008 Cohort Dummy -0.173*** (0.038) 
-0.213*** 
(0.033) 
2009 Cohort Dummy -0.197*** (0.035) 
-0.192*** 
(0.033) 
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2010 Cohort Dummy -0.215*** (0.042) 
-0.200*** 
(0.033) 
2011 Cohort Dummy -0.103* (0.063) — 
2012 Cohort Dummy — — 
N 226148 478571 
Disposition Condition <= 2 Years <= 3 Years 
Examiner Grade Level Dummies? YES YES 
Examiner Experience Group Dummies? YES YES 
Examiner Tenure Group Dummies? YES YES 
Disposal Year Fixed Effects? YES YES 
* Significant at 10 percent. ** Significant at 5 percent; *** Significant at 1 
percent.  
        Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered to 
correct for autocorrelation within given examiners over time. Each observation 
is a given application from the PAIR database that reached a final disposition 
and was published in the PAIR records between March 2001 and July 2012, 
subject to the stated prosecution duration restriction. Column (1) drops 
applications disposed of in 1993 and by examiners hired in 2012, while Column 
(2) drops applications disposed of in 1993 and by examiners hired in 2011 and 
2012.  
V.  INFERENCE 
The numerous hiring-year coefficients presented in Table A1 are 
meant to be interpreted with reference to the omitted hiring-year 
cohort—that is, the 1993 cohort. The specific hypotheses that we are 
testing in this Article (beyond the general hypothesis of the presence 
of cohort effects in the first instance, which can be assessed via the F-
tests presented in Table A1) do not necessarily bear on the year-by-
year comparisons that the standard errors in Table A1 may be 
designed to facilitate. Rather we are seeking to compare grant rates 
across a coarser divide of hiring-year cohorts, mainly pre-2003–2004 
cohorts vs. mid- to late-2000 cohorts, and mid- to late-2000 cohorts vs. 
post-2010 cohorts. In Table A3, we estimate specifications identical to 
those estimated above, but we group hiring cohorts into three groups: 
1993–2002 cohorts, 2005–2008 cohorts, and 2011–2012 cohorts. To 
address concerns over how to specify the operable regime when the 
quality-assurance initiatives driving our delineation of hiring-culture 
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eras are being rolled out, we drop those cohorts from the specification 
that started at the PTO during the specific years marking the 
transition across the relevant eras (2003 and 2004, 2009 and 2010), 
allowing us to make steady-state comparisons across eras. In Column 
(2) of Table A3, we control for the available individual application 
covariates at our disposal (entity-size and foreign-priority status). 
Table A3: Relationship Between Grant Rates and Hiring Era Cohorts 
(Omitting Transition Years) 
 (1) (2) 
Omitted: Permissive Era I (Pre-2003–2004 Cohorts) — — 
Restrictive Era (2005–2008 Cohorts) -0.071*** (0.009) 
-0.052*** 
(0.010) 
Permissive Era II (2011+ Cohorts) -0.042* (0.023) 
-0.003 
(0.025) 
N 999275 867867 
P-value of Test: Restrictive Era vs. Permissive ERA II 0.15 0.02 
Individual Application Covariates? NO YES 
Technology Dummies (Hall et al. Categories)? YES YES 
Examiner Grade Level Dummies? YES YES 
Examiner Experience Group Dummies? YES YES 
Examiner Tenure Group Dummies? YES YES 
Disposal Year Fixed Effects? YES YES 
* Significant at 10 percent. ** Significant at 5 percent. *** Significant at 1 percent. 
        Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered to correct 
for autocorrelation within given examiners over time. Each observation is a given 
application from the PAIR database that reached a final disposition and was 
published in the PAIR records between March 2001 and July 2012. Individual 
application covariates in Column (2) include an indicator for the entity-size status 
of the applicant (large or small entity) and an indicator for whether or not the 
application has foreign priority (whether it was previously filed at the European 
Patent Office or Japan Patent Office). 
The final hypothesis that we test in this Article bears on the 
effect of moving from a short, centralized training period of two 
weeks to a robust, PTO-run training program of eight months in 2006, 
with roughly half of the examiners in the 2006 cohort receiving the 
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new training program and half receiving the old program (with 
assignment based on technology, which we control for). Rather than 
just comparing the grant rate of these two particular cohorts, we still 
estimate an empirical specification on the full set of cohorts and 
sample years, allowing us to achieve separation between year effects, 
cohort effects, and experience effects while trying to isolate the 
inherent granting tendencies of these two particular groups. As such, 
we estimate specifications that modify the approach taken in Table 
A3 to break the mid-2000s era into four separate groups: a 2005 
cohort (a mid-2000 restrictive cohort purely under the old training 
regime), a 2006 cohort under the old training regime (the 2006 cohort 
control group), a 2006 cohort under the new training regime (the 2006 
cohort treatment group), and the 2007 and 2008 cohorts (mid-2000 
restrictive cohorts purely under the new training regime). We present 
the results of this exercise in Table A4. 
All else being equal, Tables A3 and A4 suggest a statistically 
significant decline in mean grant rates between examiner cohorts 
starting with the PTO in the mid-2000s and cohorts starting in the 
prior period. They also suggest a statistically significant subsequent 
increase in granting tendencies for the most recently hired cohorts 
relative to the prior cohorts (note that Table A4 arguably allows for a 
better test of this second comparison to the extent it allows for an 
observation of how things change around the time of transition to the 
recent permissive regime). Moreover, Table A4 demonstrates that the 
2006 treatment cohort that was subjected to the new training program 
had a lower grant rate relative to the 2006 control cohort that was not 
subject to the new training program (statistically significant at the 10 
percent level or 1 percent level depending on the specification), 
consistent with expectations that the training would more strongly 
induce new hires to adopt the prevailing views promulgated by the 
agency heads at that time. 
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Table A4: Relationship Between Grant Rates and Hiring Era Cohorts 
(Omitting Transition Years) 
 (1) (2) 
Omitted: Permissive Era I (Pre-2003–2004 Cohorts) — — 
Restrictive Era Old Training Regime (2005 Cohort) -0.064*** 
(0.011) 
-0.049*** 
(0.011) 
2006 Cohort under Old Training Regime -0.074*** 
(0.013) 
-0.057*** 
(0.014) 
2006 Cohort under New Training Regime -0.097*** 
(0.012) 
-0.087*** 
(0.013) 
Restrictive Era New Training Regime (2007–2008 
Cohorts) 
-0.122*** 
(0.012) 
-0.102*** 
(0.013) 
Permissive Era II (2011+ Cohorts) -0.065*** 
(0.023) 
-0.031 
(0.024) 
N 999275 867867 
P-value of Test: 2006 Cohort under Old Training 
Regime vs. 2006 Cohort under New Training Regime 0.06 0.01 
P-value of Test: Restrictive Era New Training Regime 
vs. Permissive Era II 0.01 0.00 
Individual Application Covariates? NO YES 
Technology Dummies (Hall et al. Categories)? YES YES 
Examiner Grade Level Dummies? YES YES 
Examiner Experience Group Dummies? YES YES 
Examiner Tenure Group Dummies? YES YES 
Disposal Year Fixed Effects? YES YES 
* Significant at 10 percent. ** Significant at 5 percent. *** Significant at 1 percent. 
        Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered to 
correct for autocorrelation within given examiners over time. Each observation is 
a given application from the PAIR database that reached a final disposition and 
that was published in the PAIR records between March 2001 and July 2012. 
Individual application covariates in Column (2) include an indicator for the 
entity-size status of the applicant (large or small entity) and an indicator for 
whether or not the application has foreign priority (whether it was previously 
filed at the European Patent Office or Japan Patent Office). 
 
 
